Finland and Sweden are the only two Arctic nations that do not directly border the Arctic Ocean, with Finland being the most westerly—and thus proximate to Russia—of the two. Finland and Sweden’s interest lie first in ensuring national security as the Arctic becomes more heavily trafficked. Russia operates nuclear power plants close to their borders and poses a significant environmental hazard to both nations. Finland and Sweden both recognize the national threats that Arctic development poses and, as stated in the Stoltenberg Report, are willing to work in a cooperative fashion to design solutions relating to good governance and management of Arctic resources.
From a national security standpoint, the Stoltenberg Report calls on Finland and Sweden to aid in air overflights of Iceland, which has been largely without air surveillance since the 2006 US withdrawal from the Keflavik base. The Nordic states have also discussed coordination in other areas such as medical assistance, education and exercise ranges. While Finland and Sweden should encourage cooperation in the Arctic, they should also selectively manage their commitments in the Arctic and to tailor them to national purposes. Strategic choices such as whether to invest in military capabilities or scientific research are likely to raise tensions within the Nordic group and will undoubtedly involve compromises on all sides.
03 October 2010
Denmark/Greenland: Hydrocarbon Claims and Territory Disputes
Via Greenland, Denmark has a large geographic claim to the Arctic region. Like Russia, Denmark is claiming the North Pole. It claims that the western portion of the Lomonosov Ridge extends from Greenland to the pole and that therefore the Danes have the right to sovereignty over the pole itself. Denmark is also pushing some territorial claims in the islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, saying that they are in fact an extension of Greenland's continental shelf.
As Denmark’s interest in the High North has increased, the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS) has experienced a recent multimillion-dollar funding increase. This is clear evidence that Denmark believes there is natural gas and oil potential in the region. Indeed, Greenland's Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum recently put the seabed of parts of the Greenland side of the Davis Strait to bid. Oil and natural gas are potential revenue-producers for both Denmark and Greenland officials as extraction techniques improve and more ice melts.
Greenland is in a relatively unique strategic position in the Arctic. Greenland is not physically connected to any major economy and as such could serve only as a launching point for military operations. It also has a population, according to the 2008 World Development Indicators, of only 56,739. In short, Greenland is isolated enough from the rest of the world that while not militarily powerful it faces a smaller national security threat than, say, Norway, Canada or Russia, whose Arctic borders are all gateways to major economies. With its limited resources, Greenland's ability—and need—to develop any sort of significant oceangoing Arctic operations are extremely limited. However, bilateral or multilateral agreements that provide Greenland with icebreaking capabilities could help to enforce environmental regulations and provide search and rescue within Greenland’s territory.
Oil and gas operations off of the shore of Greenland will likely use other nations' ports for day-to-day operations such as refining crude oil given the limited demand for these resources in Greenland and the country's distance from major economies. There is little reason that the Arctic sledge patrols in place for decades cannot continue to serve national security purposes. In addition, Greenland's harsh climate, including recent increased inland precipitation, makes any human activity extremely difficulty in much of the country, particularly to the north—a fact the early Viking settlers learned the hard way.
In light of Greenland’s resource endowment, Greenland and Denmark should focus on environmental and economic concerns. Clearly, developing the oil fields within the limits of Greenland's Exclusive Economic Zone has the potential to generate government revenues and job opportunities. Promoting indigenous peoples as a good source of labor for these operations can ensure that the domestic job market is positively impact by offshore drilling. Greenland and Denmark should participate in environmental monitoring and protection programs: the local environment is of vital importance to local ways of living and must be protected as such. Fish, walrus, whale and seal stocks need to be well-monitored, perhaps jointly with other proximate nations such as the United States, Iceland and Canada. Denmark's government and the local people will need to reach a medium between seeking to exploit the region and continuing to provide for, protect and incorporate Greenlanders into the resource economy.
As Denmark’s interest in the High North has increased, the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS) has experienced a recent multimillion-dollar funding increase. This is clear evidence that Denmark believes there is natural gas and oil potential in the region. Indeed, Greenland's Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum recently put the seabed of parts of the Greenland side of the Davis Strait to bid. Oil and natural gas are potential revenue-producers for both Denmark and Greenland officials as extraction techniques improve and more ice melts.
Greenland is in a relatively unique strategic position in the Arctic. Greenland is not physically connected to any major economy and as such could serve only as a launching point for military operations. It also has a population, according to the 2008 World Development Indicators, of only 56,739. In short, Greenland is isolated enough from the rest of the world that while not militarily powerful it faces a smaller national security threat than, say, Norway, Canada or Russia, whose Arctic borders are all gateways to major economies. With its limited resources, Greenland's ability—and need—to develop any sort of significant oceangoing Arctic operations are extremely limited. However, bilateral or multilateral agreements that provide Greenland with icebreaking capabilities could help to enforce environmental regulations and provide search and rescue within Greenland’s territory.
Oil and gas operations off of the shore of Greenland will likely use other nations' ports for day-to-day operations such as refining crude oil given the limited demand for these resources in Greenland and the country's distance from major economies. There is little reason that the Arctic sledge patrols in place for decades cannot continue to serve national security purposes. In addition, Greenland's harsh climate, including recent increased inland precipitation, makes any human activity extremely difficulty in much of the country, particularly to the north—a fact the early Viking settlers learned the hard way.
In light of Greenland’s resource endowment, Greenland and Denmark should focus on environmental and economic concerns. Clearly, developing the oil fields within the limits of Greenland's Exclusive Economic Zone has the potential to generate government revenues and job opportunities. Promoting indigenous peoples as a good source of labor for these operations can ensure that the domestic job market is positively impact by offshore drilling. Greenland and Denmark should participate in environmental monitoring and protection programs: the local environment is of vital importance to local ways of living and must be protected as such. Fish, walrus, whale and seal stocks need to be well-monitored, perhaps jointly with other proximate nations such as the United States, Iceland and Canada. Denmark's government and the local people will need to reach a medium between seeking to exploit the region and continuing to provide for, protect and incorporate Greenlanders into the resource economy.
Norway: Promoting Science, Cooperation and an Increased Nordic Presence
Located at the Western end of the Northern Sea Route, Norway is effectively Russia's Arctic neighbor. Cognizant that it cannot challenge Russia in the Arctic, the Norwegian government seeks to maintain friendly relations with the Kremlin. Indeed, to this end the Norwegian government’s High North Strategy outlines two programs to facilitate cooperative Norwegian-Russian relations: first, an exchange program for Russian students and second, a proposal for an economic and industrial cooperation zone that covers Norwegian and Russian Arctic territories. In addition, Norway seeks to exercise its authority in a credible and predictable manner and considers sustainable Arctic development an imperative of strategic importance for Norway.
Norway currently has two ice-class vessels, both used for research. While the KV Svalbard is relatively new (2001) and is the largest vessel in the Norwegian armed forces, the government stated in 2007 that it would assess the need for a new, larger ice-class vessel. In 2008, Norway made a smaller contribution towards its presence in the Arctic by signing a contract with Rolls-Royce for a 328-foot Polar Class 10 research vessel deliverable in 2012 and capable of navigating in ice up to one foot thick. In the future, building a larger vessel would further strengthen the international knowledge base in the High Arctic while simultaneously increasing Norway's Arctic presence. Such a vessel would also add to Norway's already significant commitment to High Arctic education and knowledge-building: in 1993, the most northerly higher education institution, the University Centre in Svalbard, was established in Norway.
The Barents Sea is the region of the highest priority for Norway in the Arctic. In particular, despite relatively friendly relations there remains a section known as the Loop Hole of 67,000 square miles disputed between Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea (See Figure 5, Number 4). With significant estimated petroleum reserves, the Barents Sea and the Loop Hole are important strategic resources for the Norwegian economy. However, a 2006 submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf did not result in Norwegian sovereignty over the Loop Hole. Instead, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf recommended that only a bilateral maritime boundary agreement between Russia and Norway can solve the dispute.
In 2009, Norway became the first state to move its military headquarters to the High North, in Reitan. This move is in line with the country's increasing focus on the Arctic. There are also revived talks of a regional defense forum, which could facilitate regional resource sharing as Sweden nor Finland are NATO members. However, it is important to note that increased cooperation would be unlikely to take the form of a formal regional defense agreement, instead focusing on increased regional cooperation for security and operational purposes. In the Stoltenberg Report, which outlines the proposed forum, Thorvald Stoltenberg envisions a “Nordic maritime response force with search and rescue expertise and icebreaker capacity.” The Stoltenberg Report was generally well-received at its 2009 presentation and the Nordic ministers clearly see benefits in regional cooperation.
Finally, Norway is concerned about its indigenous peoples and environmental impacts of increased human presence in the Arctic. The government intends to conduct research on the effects of more intensive use of the High North, particularly in vulnerable areas, and to increase awareness about wilderness-like areas such as northern continental Norway and Svalbard. It also intends to outline a clear environmental operational framework for public- and private-sector interests in the Arctic. In addition, it has outlined a management and monitoring system for the Barents Sea and the sea in the Lofoten area. The Norwegian Polar Institute and the Institute of Marine Research will also continue to conduct research on the environment, meteorology and climate change in addition to performing a variety of other tasks, including monitoring regional fisheries. With regards to native Sami culture, the government plans to promote increased trade opportunities for native people, safeguard native food sources, promote native radio stations and invite northern people to play a key role in the development of the region.
Norway currently has two ice-class vessels, both used for research. While the KV Svalbard is relatively new (2001) and is the largest vessel in the Norwegian armed forces, the government stated in 2007 that it would assess the need for a new, larger ice-class vessel. In 2008, Norway made a smaller contribution towards its presence in the Arctic by signing a contract with Rolls-Royce for a 328-foot Polar Class 10 research vessel deliverable in 2012 and capable of navigating in ice up to one foot thick. In the future, building a larger vessel would further strengthen the international knowledge base in the High Arctic while simultaneously increasing Norway's Arctic presence. Such a vessel would also add to Norway's already significant commitment to High Arctic education and knowledge-building: in 1993, the most northerly higher education institution, the University Centre in Svalbard, was established in Norway.
The Barents Sea is the region of the highest priority for Norway in the Arctic. In particular, despite relatively friendly relations there remains a section known as the Loop Hole of 67,000 square miles disputed between Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea (See Figure 5, Number 4). With significant estimated petroleum reserves, the Barents Sea and the Loop Hole are important strategic resources for the Norwegian economy. However, a 2006 submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf did not result in Norwegian sovereignty over the Loop Hole. Instead, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf recommended that only a bilateral maritime boundary agreement between Russia and Norway can solve the dispute.
In 2009, Norway became the first state to move its military headquarters to the High North, in Reitan. This move is in line with the country's increasing focus on the Arctic. There are also revived talks of a regional defense forum, which could facilitate regional resource sharing as Sweden nor Finland are NATO members. However, it is important to note that increased cooperation would be unlikely to take the form of a formal regional defense agreement, instead focusing on increased regional cooperation for security and operational purposes. In the Stoltenberg Report, which outlines the proposed forum, Thorvald Stoltenberg envisions a “Nordic maritime response force with search and rescue expertise and icebreaker capacity.” The Stoltenberg Report was generally well-received at its 2009 presentation and the Nordic ministers clearly see benefits in regional cooperation.
Finally, Norway is concerned about its indigenous peoples and environmental impacts of increased human presence in the Arctic. The government intends to conduct research on the effects of more intensive use of the High North, particularly in vulnerable areas, and to increase awareness about wilderness-like areas such as northern continental Norway and Svalbard. It also intends to outline a clear environmental operational framework for public- and private-sector interests in the Arctic. In addition, it has outlined a management and monitoring system for the Barents Sea and the sea in the Lofoten area. The Norwegian Polar Institute and the Institute of Marine Research will also continue to conduct research on the environment, meteorology and climate change in addition to performing a variety of other tasks, including monitoring regional fisheries. With regards to native Sami culture, the government plans to promote increased trade opportunities for native people, safeguard native food sources, promote native radio stations and invite northern people to play a key role in the development of the region.
Russian Policy in the Polar North: In Pursuit of Vital Interests
A September 2008 document addressing Russian Arctic policy until 2020 makes it clear that Russia, unlike the United States and Canada, has no qualms devoting economic as well as political resources to the development of the Arctic. Russia views the Arctic as a significant vessel for mineral and oil revenue. Russia has invested in an icebreaker fleet with which it has attempted to monetize transport through the Northern Sea Route, requiring all vessels to be accompanied by a Russian icebreaker for a fee. The Russian government also has a significant personal stake in the Arctic: the Kremlin owns the largest Russian shipping company and through the 2006 expropriation of Yukos has created the largest oil company in the country. Much of Russian shipbuilding has been nationalized under the United Shipbuilding Corporation. The United Shipbuilding Corporation has helped to build Russia's icebreaker fleet, the largest and most technologically advanced in the world with the world's only seven nuclear-powered icebreakers, as well as new Russian ice-reinforced tankers designed for Arctic transport. In the wake of the worldwide financial crisis, Russia's dominant strategy and position in the Arctic could help it gain significant financial and political leverage in the coming years while also providing the foundation for a new wave of economic growth in the country.
Russia has simultaneously projected an increased presence in the Arctic and expressed an interest in acting cooperatively within the region. Putin has resumed Cold War-era Arctic bomber overflights, particularly near Alaska, and Russia's nuclear icebreakers are designed to be outfitted with gun turrets if needed. While the Russians claim that their increased force projection in the region is aimed primarily at terrorism, smuggling, illegal immigration and protection of the marine environment, the increased Russian Arctic presence raises significant concerns for any nation that fears a resurgent and unbalanced Russia. Indeed, Russian officials have publicly stated that the battle over Arctic resources could well become the tipping point for world military power in the coming decades.
The main challenges for Russia in the Arctic principally involve the maintenance and development of its Arctic infrastructure, effective control of the Northern Sea Route and the approval of its submissions for an extension of its continental shelf to the North Pole. Russia's icebreaker fleet is aging: after the launch of the NS Yamal in 1993, Russia did not launch another nuclear icebreaker until the 2007 launch of NS 50 LET Pobedy (50 Years of Victory). Retrofits will extend the thirty-year lifetime of some of Russia's Arctic nuclear fleet, but with a lead time of ten years on icebreaker builds the Russian icebreaker fleet will inevitably shrink before any expansion takes place again. Still, Russia is the only country in possession of a nuclear-powered icebreaker and has most powerful icebreaker in the world, the 524-foot 50 LET Pobedy which is capable of breaking through ice up to 2.8 meters thick.
To update Russia’s icebreaking fleet, Vladimir Putin is working directly with Sergey Kiriyenko of Rosatom, the Russian nuclear company responsible for the country's nuclear icebreakers. Russia plans to develop three new nuclear class icebreakers by 2020 in addition to one lead icebreaker, seven diesel-electric and four port-supporting icebreakers. This will add to Russia's total icebreaker fleet of forty vessels and ensure the fleet's operational capacity beyond 2020. State as well as private Russian interests have also invested in new Arctic-class tankers to operate on the Northern Sea Route. Russia also needs to invest in the maintenance of Arctic ports neglected during the 1990s and the development of new ports that allow Russia to more effectively enforce environmental and shipping regulations along the Northern Sea Route. Building new icebreakers and ice-reinforced tankers will preserve and reinforce Russia's capacity to operate in the Arctic. Within the next few years, Russia also hopes that the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf will approve Russian claims to the eastern portion of the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater mountain chain extending from northern Russia to Greenland, as an extension of the Siberian continental shelf. Access to this additional 465,000 square miles of Arctic territory—approximately equivalent to the size of California—including the geographic North Pole would provide Russia, already the world's largest natural gas provider, with an even larger natural resource base to tap. Given that most Arctic natural gas lies in Russian territory and that Donald Gautier of the US Geological Survey estimates that most Arctic natural gas and oil reserves are located at depths of less than five hundred meters of water, making them recoverable with current technology, the payoff for Russia could be huge – in the trillions of dollars.
Russia has simultaneously projected an increased presence in the Arctic and expressed an interest in acting cooperatively within the region. Putin has resumed Cold War-era Arctic bomber overflights, particularly near Alaska, and Russia's nuclear icebreakers are designed to be outfitted with gun turrets if needed. While the Russians claim that their increased force projection in the region is aimed primarily at terrorism, smuggling, illegal immigration and protection of the marine environment, the increased Russian Arctic presence raises significant concerns for any nation that fears a resurgent and unbalanced Russia. Indeed, Russian officials have publicly stated that the battle over Arctic resources could well become the tipping point for world military power in the coming decades.
The main challenges for Russia in the Arctic principally involve the maintenance and development of its Arctic infrastructure, effective control of the Northern Sea Route and the approval of its submissions for an extension of its continental shelf to the North Pole. Russia's icebreaker fleet is aging: after the launch of the NS Yamal in 1993, Russia did not launch another nuclear icebreaker until the 2007 launch of NS 50 LET Pobedy (50 Years of Victory). Retrofits will extend the thirty-year lifetime of some of Russia's Arctic nuclear fleet, but with a lead time of ten years on icebreaker builds the Russian icebreaker fleet will inevitably shrink before any expansion takes place again. Still, Russia is the only country in possession of a nuclear-powered icebreaker and has most powerful icebreaker in the world, the 524-foot 50 LET Pobedy which is capable of breaking through ice up to 2.8 meters thick.
To update Russia’s icebreaking fleet, Vladimir Putin is working directly with Sergey Kiriyenko of Rosatom, the Russian nuclear company responsible for the country's nuclear icebreakers. Russia plans to develop three new nuclear class icebreakers by 2020 in addition to one lead icebreaker, seven diesel-electric and four port-supporting icebreakers. This will add to Russia's total icebreaker fleet of forty vessels and ensure the fleet's operational capacity beyond 2020. State as well as private Russian interests have also invested in new Arctic-class tankers to operate on the Northern Sea Route. Russia also needs to invest in the maintenance of Arctic ports neglected during the 1990s and the development of new ports that allow Russia to more effectively enforce environmental and shipping regulations along the Northern Sea Route. Building new icebreakers and ice-reinforced tankers will preserve and reinforce Russia's capacity to operate in the Arctic. Within the next few years, Russia also hopes that the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf will approve Russian claims to the eastern portion of the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater mountain chain extending from northern Russia to Greenland, as an extension of the Siberian continental shelf. Access to this additional 465,000 square miles of Arctic territory—approximately equivalent to the size of California—including the geographic North Pole would provide Russia, already the world's largest natural gas provider, with an even larger natural resource base to tap. Given that most Arctic natural gas lies in Russian territory and that Donald Gautier of the US Geological Survey estimates that most Arctic natural gas and oil reserves are located at depths of less than five hundred meters of water, making them recoverable with current technology, the payoff for Russia could be huge – in the trillions of dollars.
The United States: Security, Shipping and Commercial Exploitation
As Canada's North American Arctic neighbor and the largest global importer, the United States has a lot at risk in the Arctic debate. However, United States policymakers continue to send the message that the country is unready to convey a significant and coherent message about its role in the Arctic. Despite estimates from the US Geological Survey that 22% of the world's technically recoverable resources are located in the Arctic, the region was not even mentioned by President Obama in the 2010 State of the Union address. The United States' oceangoing capabilities in the region remain minimal in 2010 and will stay so for the foreseeable future, with only two operable icebreakers and one of those two constantly committed to resupplying the Antarctic McMurdo station.
The interests of the United States in the Arctic are threefold. First, national security is a principal concern. The Arctic is the shortest route between the world's strongest economies. Therefore, an open polar sea presents concerns about an increased military presence in the region. Indeed, since the Cold War the Arctic has played host to the most extensive nuclear submarine operations in the world. With a warming Arctic, some nations will step up their military presence—surface, subsurface and airborne—in the region. In addition to the waterborne and airborne threat this poses to the United States, the long and largely unprotected Canadian and Alaskan Arctic borders continue to present a security threat for landing troops. The Canadians have long adopted a policy of not building roads in the Far North as a preventive measure that would significantly hamper the movement of any unwelcome visitors. However, this is not a viable long-term policy given the potential for resource development in the region and that infrastructure that will accompany development. The United States needs to cooperate with Canada and address the threat of an exposed North American Arctic border and ensure that the Canadian and Alaskan borders do not become points of military contention and a threat to the United States' national security.
As the world's leading importer and a significant exporter, the United States also has a significant interest in the potential of the Arctic Ocean for reducing oceangoing transit times and costs. American businesses stand to gain from shorter lead times and reduced expenses if the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route open to cargo vessels. Indeed, because over ninety percent of world trade is conducted by ship the potential impact of these routes is difficult to understate. However, the United States must also ensure that reasonable safety standards are enforced and that the proper environmental protection measures are in place. An oil spill in the Northwest Passage would be difficult to contain and could turn public opinion against use of the Arctic for commercial shipping or natural resource extraction. The United States should also ensure that search and rescue bases across the northern longitudes are appropriately equipped to assist in an Arctic search and rescue mission that may take place far offshore. Doing so would be a signal to industry that the United States expects the northern passages to become and remain commercially viable and that it is committed to protecting those who make use of these passages. If appropriately coordinated multinational search and rescue operations are not put in place, Arctic shipping would be more risky than necessary and shipping would divert from the Arctic as a means of risk aversion. This would in turn hamper the competitiveness of the trade-dependent American economy.
Finally, the United States should be interested in the Arctic because the region can provide much-needed short-term energy security. Both onshore and offshore drilling and mining can help to bolster US oil and mineral reserves while providing fiscal relief in the form of leases to the US federal government, which in recent years has run record budget deficits. In addition, increased drilling within the United States' 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone would create real job growth at a time when the United States economy is in desperate need of a sustainable recovery. In Alaska, oil revenue is expected to account for eighty-seven percent of state revenues over the next decade. Trickle-down money from the oil industry drives nearly every sector of the Alaskan economy. With developed onshore sites in Alaska drying up, responsible expansion of oil and mineral recovery on US territory will be necessary to maintain stability in the Alaskan economy. It is likewise in the interest of the United States to facilitate the expansion of US oil, gas and mineral companies' Arctic operations on non-US territory.
The interests of the United States in the Arctic are threefold. First, national security is a principal concern. The Arctic is the shortest route between the world's strongest economies. Therefore, an open polar sea presents concerns about an increased military presence in the region. Indeed, since the Cold War the Arctic has played host to the most extensive nuclear submarine operations in the world. With a warming Arctic, some nations will step up their military presence—surface, subsurface and airborne—in the region. In addition to the waterborne and airborne threat this poses to the United States, the long and largely unprotected Canadian and Alaskan Arctic borders continue to present a security threat for landing troops. The Canadians have long adopted a policy of not building roads in the Far North as a preventive measure that would significantly hamper the movement of any unwelcome visitors. However, this is not a viable long-term policy given the potential for resource development in the region and that infrastructure that will accompany development. The United States needs to cooperate with Canada and address the threat of an exposed North American Arctic border and ensure that the Canadian and Alaskan borders do not become points of military contention and a threat to the United States' national security.
As the world's leading importer and a significant exporter, the United States also has a significant interest in the potential of the Arctic Ocean for reducing oceangoing transit times and costs. American businesses stand to gain from shorter lead times and reduced expenses if the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route open to cargo vessels. Indeed, because over ninety percent of world trade is conducted by ship the potential impact of these routes is difficult to understate. However, the United States must also ensure that reasonable safety standards are enforced and that the proper environmental protection measures are in place. An oil spill in the Northwest Passage would be difficult to contain and could turn public opinion against use of the Arctic for commercial shipping or natural resource extraction. The United States should also ensure that search and rescue bases across the northern longitudes are appropriately equipped to assist in an Arctic search and rescue mission that may take place far offshore. Doing so would be a signal to industry that the United States expects the northern passages to become and remain commercially viable and that it is committed to protecting those who make use of these passages. If appropriately coordinated multinational search and rescue operations are not put in place, Arctic shipping would be more risky than necessary and shipping would divert from the Arctic as a means of risk aversion. This would in turn hamper the competitiveness of the trade-dependent American economy.
Finally, the United States should be interested in the Arctic because the region can provide much-needed short-term energy security. Both onshore and offshore drilling and mining can help to bolster US oil and mineral reserves while providing fiscal relief in the form of leases to the US federal government, which in recent years has run record budget deficits. In addition, increased drilling within the United States' 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone would create real job growth at a time when the United States economy is in desperate need of a sustainable recovery. In Alaska, oil revenue is expected to account for eighty-seven percent of state revenues over the next decade. Trickle-down money from the oil industry drives nearly every sector of the Alaskan economy. With developed onshore sites in Alaska drying up, responsible expansion of oil and mineral recovery on US territory will be necessary to maintain stability in the Alaskan economy. It is likewise in the interest of the United States to facilitate the expansion of US oil, gas and mineral companies' Arctic operations on non-US territory.
Empty Canadian Promises
No single state disputes that Canada owns the waters between the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and its northern borders, including the Northwest Passage. However, the United States insists that within Canadian internal waters runs an international strait, the Northwest Passage. Meanwhile, the Russians, who have no problem acknowledging that the Northwest Passage is part of Canadian internal waters, have an ongoing territorial interest in Canada's Arctic: Russia is currently mapping a section of the Arctic seabed that could conflict with Canadian claims in the Arctic. It is in Canada’s national interest to claim as large a portion of the seabed as possible and to legally assert that the Northwest Passage is not an international strait. This would allow Canada to maintain sovereignty and legal authority in the Northwest Passage while maximizing potential natural resource reserves. In addition, foreign ships running close to the Canadian coast would pose a significant hazard to Canada from an environmental as well as national security standpoint. If the Northwest Passage were recognized as an international strait aircraft would have the right of overflight in the region, opening Canada up to a host of other problems including air pollution, remote search and rescue and radar monitoring of flights.
Canadian public policy has long failed to live up to legislative pledges to increase Canadian Arctic operational capability and assert effective sovereignty in the region. The country's claims in the Arctic region originate in British claims first made by John Cabot when he landed off the coast of Labrador, Newfoundland in 1497 and further cemented during Martin Frobisher's sixteenth century voyages to the Canadian Arctic, in particular Baffin Island. Since Canada inherited its Arctic territories from Britain, it can trace sovereignty in the region further back than any other Arctic state.
In spite of this, Canada has frequently failed to enforce its legal rule in the region. For instance, when the United States built the Alaskan highway, which cuts through Canadian territory, the US government simply asked to do so and was granted permission. In addition, much of Canadian Arctic territory, including the Northwest Passage, was discovered by men who were not Canadian (or British). Canada has frequently failed to demonstrate an ongoing claim in the form of legal rule by, for instance, failing to establish post offices, courts and other government outposts, thus further weakening its claims to remote regions of the Arctic. During the Klondike gold rush, Canadians actually composed a minority of the population in the Yukon; however, there was no serious threat to Canadian control of the region at the time as the Canadians maintained a paradoxically large police presence in the few heavily population areas.
Around the time of World War I, any threat to Canadian sovereignty and security in the Arctic was considered unlikely. No nation could quickly mobilize across the Arctic ice and the icebound region was of little importance, economic or political, to either the Canadian government or to other nations. Mounted patrols in the region provided a Canadian presence and all the proof of sovereignty Canada felt it needed. Between World War I and World War II, Canada focused on maintaining national unity; the United States, through President Roosevelt, gave assurance that it would intervene should a foreign power threaten Canadian soil. Any threat to Canada from the North was also considered a threat to the United States and would be treated by such.
By 1942, the United States convinced Canada to support the Alaska Highway, which provided an overland link between Alaska and the United States. The Alaska Highway provided the United States with insurance should Japanese submarines close off the sea route connecting the continental United States to Alaska. Also in 1942, a pipeline connecting the United States to the Norman Wells oil field in Alaska was laid through Canada. In all, more than 40,000 troops and United States and Canadian civilians operated in the Northwest Territories during World War II without any oversight whatsoever from the Canadian government. Finally, in 1943 Canada began to negotiate agreements to buy back American projects in the North and Americans agreed to withdraw from the region after the war while giving up on plans for additional roads and air-staging routes. Luckily for the Canadians, the United States has always viewed Canada's terrestrial Far North as a strategic front rather than an area the United States would like to assert sovereignty over. Therefore, there has always been mutually agreeable dialogue on the issue of terrestrial sovereignty.
On the sea, however, the United States has been the most direct challenger of Canadian sovereignty. The 1969-70 voyage of the US tanker Manhattan through the Northwest Passage and the later 1985 voyage of the US icebreaker Polar Sea in particular touched off debate about whether the Northwest Passage is, as the United States maintains, an international strait, or if it is instead part of Canadian internal waters. Today, Canada has made clear that it thinks it is in the Canadian national interest to assert de jure rule over the Northwest Passage, extending the rule of its maritime law over the Northwest Passage beyond the scope of what is laid out by international law. Canada has likewise extended its claims in the region by abandoning the legally ill-supported sector theory in favor of straight baselines to delineate claims to internal waters in the Far North, extending sovereignty over, for instance, the waters between the islands of the Arctic Archipelago.
Despite these increased legislative efforts to assert sovereignty in the Arctic, however, Canada today has extremely limited operational capacity in the Arctic. Its icebreaker fleet is old and incapable of projecting a military presence in the region. A 1985 promise by the conservative Mulroney government to build a Polar Class 8 icebreaker, which at the time would have been the largest in the world, was budgeted just half of the real dollars needed and eventually the idea was scrapped. While Canadian policymakers say they are committed to protecting and mapping Canadian claims within the region, due by 2013 under UNCLOS, the reality is that Canada's fiscal commitment to implementing policies has consistently lagged. Today, although Canada has the second-longest continuous Arctic coastline, the country has only one large and four medium-sized icebreakers. None of these icebreakers are nuclear and therefore all have not only limited operational capabilities but also limited range. Canada should, therefore, recognize that it will need help from other nations, such as the United States, in order to enforce environmental regulations, project force in the region and ensure national security at its northern border. Neglecting to do so will allow the Russians, with a fleet of heavy nuclear icebreakers, to operate at will in the northern Arctic Ocean, which Canada's icebreaker fleet is incapable of penetrating between November and May. Canada’s current commitment to building eight light class Arctic vessels at a 25-year build and operating cost of $4.3 billion will not allow the country to effectively assert sovereignty in the Arctic.
In addition, Canada must work with non-state actors, such as corporations, to build the infrastructure that will be necessary to transport gas, oil and seabed minerals out of the region as the Arctic region melts. Doing so will be a boon to Canada's northern economy, generate government revenue through revenue sharing, taxes and the sale of leases and help to defray some of the costs associated with building this infrastructure. Working in coordination with other actors will also allow Canada to maintain better oversight of northern operations, create and enforce environmental regulations more effectively and do a better job of making sure the government gets a share of the revenue generated by natural resource extraction in the Arctic.
Canadian public policy has long failed to live up to legislative pledges to increase Canadian Arctic operational capability and assert effective sovereignty in the region. The country's claims in the Arctic region originate in British claims first made by John Cabot when he landed off the coast of Labrador, Newfoundland in 1497 and further cemented during Martin Frobisher's sixteenth century voyages to the Canadian Arctic, in particular Baffin Island. Since Canada inherited its Arctic territories from Britain, it can trace sovereignty in the region further back than any other Arctic state.
In spite of this, Canada has frequently failed to enforce its legal rule in the region. For instance, when the United States built the Alaskan highway, which cuts through Canadian territory, the US government simply asked to do so and was granted permission. In addition, much of Canadian Arctic territory, including the Northwest Passage, was discovered by men who were not Canadian (or British). Canada has frequently failed to demonstrate an ongoing claim in the form of legal rule by, for instance, failing to establish post offices, courts and other government outposts, thus further weakening its claims to remote regions of the Arctic. During the Klondike gold rush, Canadians actually composed a minority of the population in the Yukon; however, there was no serious threat to Canadian control of the region at the time as the Canadians maintained a paradoxically large police presence in the few heavily population areas.
Around the time of World War I, any threat to Canadian sovereignty and security in the Arctic was considered unlikely. No nation could quickly mobilize across the Arctic ice and the icebound region was of little importance, economic or political, to either the Canadian government or to other nations. Mounted patrols in the region provided a Canadian presence and all the proof of sovereignty Canada felt it needed. Between World War I and World War II, Canada focused on maintaining national unity; the United States, through President Roosevelt, gave assurance that it would intervene should a foreign power threaten Canadian soil. Any threat to Canada from the North was also considered a threat to the United States and would be treated by such.
By 1942, the United States convinced Canada to support the Alaska Highway, which provided an overland link between Alaska and the United States. The Alaska Highway provided the United States with insurance should Japanese submarines close off the sea route connecting the continental United States to Alaska. Also in 1942, a pipeline connecting the United States to the Norman Wells oil field in Alaska was laid through Canada. In all, more than 40,000 troops and United States and Canadian civilians operated in the Northwest Territories during World War II without any oversight whatsoever from the Canadian government. Finally, in 1943 Canada began to negotiate agreements to buy back American projects in the North and Americans agreed to withdraw from the region after the war while giving up on plans for additional roads and air-staging routes. Luckily for the Canadians, the United States has always viewed Canada's terrestrial Far North as a strategic front rather than an area the United States would like to assert sovereignty over. Therefore, there has always been mutually agreeable dialogue on the issue of terrestrial sovereignty.
On the sea, however, the United States has been the most direct challenger of Canadian sovereignty. The 1969-70 voyage of the US tanker Manhattan through the Northwest Passage and the later 1985 voyage of the US icebreaker Polar Sea in particular touched off debate about whether the Northwest Passage is, as the United States maintains, an international strait, or if it is instead part of Canadian internal waters. Today, Canada has made clear that it thinks it is in the Canadian national interest to assert de jure rule over the Northwest Passage, extending the rule of its maritime law over the Northwest Passage beyond the scope of what is laid out by international law. Canada has likewise extended its claims in the region by abandoning the legally ill-supported sector theory in favor of straight baselines to delineate claims to internal waters in the Far North, extending sovereignty over, for instance, the waters between the islands of the Arctic Archipelago.
Despite these increased legislative efforts to assert sovereignty in the Arctic, however, Canada today has extremely limited operational capacity in the Arctic. Its icebreaker fleet is old and incapable of projecting a military presence in the region. A 1985 promise by the conservative Mulroney government to build a Polar Class 8 icebreaker, which at the time would have been the largest in the world, was budgeted just half of the real dollars needed and eventually the idea was scrapped. While Canadian policymakers say they are committed to protecting and mapping Canadian claims within the region, due by 2013 under UNCLOS, the reality is that Canada's fiscal commitment to implementing policies has consistently lagged. Today, although Canada has the second-longest continuous Arctic coastline, the country has only one large and four medium-sized icebreakers. None of these icebreakers are nuclear and therefore all have not only limited operational capabilities but also limited range. Canada should, therefore, recognize that it will need help from other nations, such as the United States, in order to enforce environmental regulations, project force in the region and ensure national security at its northern border. Neglecting to do so will allow the Russians, with a fleet of heavy nuclear icebreakers, to operate at will in the northern Arctic Ocean, which Canada's icebreaker fleet is incapable of penetrating between November and May. Canada’s current commitment to building eight light class Arctic vessels at a 25-year build and operating cost of $4.3 billion will not allow the country to effectively assert sovereignty in the Arctic.
In addition, Canada must work with non-state actors, such as corporations, to build the infrastructure that will be necessary to transport gas, oil and seabed minerals out of the region as the Arctic region melts. Doing so will be a boon to Canada's northern economy, generate government revenue through revenue sharing, taxes and the sale of leases and help to defray some of the costs associated with building this infrastructure. Working in coordination with other actors will also allow Canada to maintain better oversight of northern operations, create and enforce environmental regulations more effectively and do a better job of making sure the government gets a share of the revenue generated by natural resource extraction in the Arctic.
The Arctic Actors
To discuss the Arctic legal framework, it is necessary to have a strong understanding of the present-day (2010) positions of the eight Arctic nations as well as the roles of relevant international bodies. This chapter therefore outlines each of the eight nations’ commitments in the Arctic, their political willpower to make good on promises and which of these nations (Russia) has outpaced the others in its Arctic plans. The chapter also provides a summary description of the roles of relevant international bodies, including the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, International Court of Justice, Arctic Council, indigenous peoples’ groups, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,, International Union for the Conservation of Nature,, International Hydrographic Organization and the International Maritime Organization. This will help to clarify policy discussions undertaken in Chapters IV and V.
Outline
The second chapter of this paper (posted first on this blog) provides a brief introduction to the Arctic region. An outline of past Arctic expeditions as well as the interests, history and exploits of native peoples and a summary of national claims made in the region all inform the reader on background issues relevant to the region. Additionally, this chapter explores recent changes in the region, particularly during the post-Soviet era, when the relationship between the United States and Russia became more amicable and detectable climate change trends accelerated.
Chapter three introduces the Arctic regional actors in detail. These include, but are not limited to, the eight Arctic nations – including the five nations with claims in the Arctic region – as well as fishermen, mineral and hydrocarbon companies, environmental and energy lobbies, indigenous peoples and shipping interests. The relevant policies of each state are examined in detail, as are their stated and likely ambitions in the Arctic region. These, for instance, include Russia's goal of turning the Arctic into its main resource base by 2020.[i] This chapter also introduces the international bodies involved in the Arctic. These include UNCLOS and the Arctic Council. Indigenous peoples, the United Nations Framework on the Convention for Climate Change, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, the International Hydrographic Organization and the International Maritime Organization are also all introduced and discussed.
Chapter four of this thesis examines the pros and cons of potential regime solutions in the Arctic. In particular, this chapter addresses the collective action literature and examines what a non-cooperative Arctic scenario, largely similar to the one the world faces at present, might mean for the region. The fourth chapter also puts forth the pros and cons that would accompany both logistical and policy cooperation in the Arctic.
Chapter five spells out the role that public policy can play in ensuring that the Arctic is developed sustainably. It is unrealistic to believe that the Arctic will be preserved as a pristine and untouched wilderness in the coming decades. On some issues, such as territorial disputes, UNCLOS will largely provide a framework under which the Arctic nations can operate. On other issues, such as environmental management and search and rescue, the Arctic nations need to work to devise the most effective, equitable and sustainable answer themselves. The Arctic presents a singular chance for the world's leaders to come together and announce a new commitment to managing regional resources in a committed and responsible fashion. As nations make land grabs and tensions between nations play out far offshore and out of the public eye, the region could stoke tensions reminiscent of the Cold War. If managed attentively and effectively, though, the Arctic can become a symbol of a new and admirable commitment to passing on a positive and forward-looking legacy to our children rather than perpetuating our habit of exploiting an opportunity for all it is worth no matter the deferred expense. But is there evidence that major stakeholders and government leaders realize that they have to cooperate with each other and major shipping and corporate interests on some issues in order to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes such as building the infrastructure necessary for safe navigation, reliable ship monitoring and search and rescue operations?
Chapter three introduces the Arctic regional actors in detail. These include, but are not limited to, the eight Arctic nations – including the five nations with claims in the Arctic region – as well as fishermen, mineral and hydrocarbon companies, environmental and energy lobbies, indigenous peoples and shipping interests. The relevant policies of each state are examined in detail, as are their stated and likely ambitions in the Arctic region. These, for instance, include Russia's goal of turning the Arctic into its main resource base by 2020.[i] This chapter also introduces the international bodies involved in the Arctic. These include UNCLOS and the Arctic Council. Indigenous peoples, the United Nations Framework on the Convention for Climate Change, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, the International Hydrographic Organization and the International Maritime Organization are also all introduced and discussed.
Chapter four of this thesis examines the pros and cons of potential regime solutions in the Arctic. In particular, this chapter addresses the collective action literature and examines what a non-cooperative Arctic scenario, largely similar to the one the world faces at present, might mean for the region. The fourth chapter also puts forth the pros and cons that would accompany both logistical and policy cooperation in the Arctic.
Chapter five spells out the role that public policy can play in ensuring that the Arctic is developed sustainably. It is unrealistic to believe that the Arctic will be preserved as a pristine and untouched wilderness in the coming decades. On some issues, such as territorial disputes, UNCLOS will largely provide a framework under which the Arctic nations can operate. On other issues, such as environmental management and search and rescue, the Arctic nations need to work to devise the most effective, equitable and sustainable answer themselves. The Arctic presents a singular chance for the world's leaders to come together and announce a new commitment to managing regional resources in a committed and responsible fashion. As nations make land grabs and tensions between nations play out far offshore and out of the public eye, the region could stoke tensions reminiscent of the Cold War. If managed attentively and effectively, though, the Arctic can become a symbol of a new and admirable commitment to passing on a positive and forward-looking legacy to our children rather than perpetuating our habit of exploiting an opportunity for all it is worth no matter the deferred expense. But is there evidence that major stakeholders and government leaders realize that they have to cooperate with each other and major shipping and corporate interests on some issues in order to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes such as building the infrastructure necessary for safe navigation, reliable ship monitoring and search and rescue operations?
Arctic Actors
Of the eight Arctic nations, Russia is by far the most regionally active. Vladimir Putin, in 2010 still the real head of the Russian state, recognizes the strategic and economic significance of the Arctic. Accordingly, in 2007 he established the United Shipbuilding Corporation with the express intent of increasing Russia's Arctic operational capabilities by investing in its shipbuilding industry. Russia currently operates between fourteen and eighteen icebreakers in the region, more than the seven other Arctic nations combined; a Russian icebreaker named Kapitan Khlebnikov now operated by a Vermont tourism company, Quark Expeditions, has already transited the Northern Sea Route, which runs above Russia’s northern coast, twelve times; the vessel will retire from service following the 2010 season. Additionally, Russia is pushing the concept of an Arctic Bridge – a sea passage – that would connect the Russian port of Murmansk with the Canadian port of Churchill. Duma member Artur Chilingarov's privately financed but state-supported flag-planting on the Arctic sea bed is indicative of Russia's aggressiveness in the Arctic. Indeed, Chilingarov's videotaped endeavor was a public display of symbolic support for Russia's claim to the 1200-mile-long underwater mountain known as the Lomonosov Ridge. If approved, this claim would justify, based on the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone outlined under UNCLOS, Russian sovereignty in the Western Arctic up to and including the North Pole, which is currently governed by the International Seabed Authority out of Kingston, Jamaica.
The Russians, as the French, British and Americans, have long operated submarines in the Arctic region without announcing their presence. Additionally, Russian officials have expressed a belief that military security in the Arctic region is tantamount to Russian national security. Indeed, according to a 2009 document published on its national security council website, Moscow expects the Arctic to become its main resource base by 2020. Given that Arctic researchers funded by the European Union and the National Environmental Resource Council now think recent data indicates we should rely on models that predict the total melt of summer Arctic sea ice closer to 2030-2040 rather than the longer timeline that predicted total summer ice melt by 2080, Russia has a significant leg up on its competitors. As a resurgent nation a hard-line bargainer behind the scenes in Putin, significant interests in the Arctic region and economic as well as political clout, Russia is likely to be that toughest Arctic nation to negotiate with. After all, with geographic claims as yet not ratified by UNCLOS and an economy largely dependent on natural resources production for growth, Russia has much to lose and much to gain in the Arctic. By 2020 Russia plans to create a new Arctic division of the Russian armed forces so that it is prepared to do all it can to protect its own Arctic interests.
Canada has long asserted claims of sovereignty in the Arctic region, particularly within the Arctic Archipelago and along the Northwest Passage. Due to the wending of the coast and the islands in the Arctic Archipelago, it is necessary to use the straight baselines method to outline Canada's Arctic territorial sea. The straight baselines method is also employed by four of the five other claimant Arctic states and lent support in the Canadian case by historical claims of the Inuit people around the Amundsen Gulf and Lancaster Sound.
Despite claims of sovereignty, however, any pragmatic observer can easily discern that Canada has little capacity to enforce policies in its own territorial waters. In 1977, it instituted the NORDREG reporting system for ships transiting the area – but on a voluntary basis only. The Canadian navy has not regularly operated an icebreaker in the Arctic since the 1950s and most of the five icebreakers used by the Canadian Coast Guard are nearing the end of their 30-year useful service life. Canada, in effect, has no operational capabilities in Arctic waters covered by significant ice. It is unable to enforce environmental mandates, perform search and rescue in the region or even to effectively monitor shipping traffic. Canada signed UNCLOS in 2003, so it has only four years remaining – until 2013 – to submit its geographic claims in the Arctic. Since some of the passages between the islands of the Arctic Archipelago are about sixty miles wide and the territorial sea limit is only twelve miles wide, it is foreseeable that Canada might lose legal control over shipping in a region the Canadian national anthem refers to as “The True North, Strong and Free”. Canada has for too long neglected its Arctic waters, relying on the United States for anti-submarine warfare defense and not expanding operational capabilities that would allow it to enforce environmental and shipping regulations in the region. As such, even if the waters of the Arctic Archipelago are deemed internal waters, Canada might lose a degree of its territorial sovereignty in the region if it is established that the Northwest Passage or other routes connecting the high seas through the region are international straits. In any case, Canada’s lack of resource commitment to the Arctic leaves it with a weakened hand at the negotiating table.
The United States' is in an uneasy situation in the Arctic. Geographically speaking, the United States has the most of any country to gain via ratification of UNCLOS, not just in the Arctic but off its other coastlines. However, it has not done so. The Reagan administration opposed deep-sea mining and technology transfer provisions contained in the 1982 draft of UNCLOS; however, in 1994 revisions satisfactory to ex-Reagan administration officials were made. Despite a unanimous vote of confidence from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2004 and support from groups as diverse as the Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, the Pew Oceans Commission, energy and environmental as well as fishing lobbies and the US military, a small group of radical right-wing legislators continue to stonewall ratification of UNCLOS on the ill-conceived premise that ratification would necessarily involve “the encroachment of UN rules on what they regard as the United States' rights as a sovereign nation.” This means that the United States’ rights at sea continue to lack international recognition until ratification and that the United States does not even have a seat at the negotiating table for any issue, including Arctic ones, presented to UNCLOS.
The United States' Arctic infrastructure is, as the US Coast Guard reflects, a decade of strong investment from capably meeting our responsibilities in the Arctic. As Commander Arthur Brooks states, though, it is easy to see why the Arctic will be important in the decades to come. The interest in exploiting the Arctic's mineral, oil and gas reserves is substantial: in the winter of 2008, leases in the Chukchi Sea were put up for bid. They were expected to fetch in the neighborhood of $600 million; instead, bids came in at $2.66 billion. The United States is an Arctic nation, with obligations to its native Arctic peoples. At present, the USCG cutter Healy is in the region mapping the ocean floor; however, it is the only one of the three US icebreakers is within its thirty year service time and the Coast Guard estimates it will take eight or more years – and $800 million – to build another icebreaker. Additionally, the Healy is only capable of operating at speeds of 3 knots in ice up to 4.5' thick, while the two other US icebreakers, the Polar Star and the Polar Sea, are theoretically capable of operating at 3 knots in up to 6' of ice. US Arctic infrastructure investment is low enough that the Polar Star was placed on indefinite non-operational status with a skeleton crew in Seattle after a gas turbine failed during a 2006 mission. Nearly four years later, the Coast Guard announced that it had resolved funding issues which will allows the Polar Star to return to operation for a limited period of time after repairs are completed in 2013. Additionally, the US must constantly have one of its two icebreakers committed to resupplying the Antarctic McMurdo station. As Admiral Thad Allen reflected in testimony to Congress, the average age of US High Endurance Cutters (which are not icebreakers) as of 2008 was 39 years old. If the United States wants to influence the rules or guidelines that could affect its gas hydrates outside the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone and take a leadership role in the management of the world's oceans, it needs a seat at the table of the Continental Shelf Commission, which would require ratification of UNCLOS. In short, the United States needs to sign UNCLOS and invest in its commitment to Arctic operational capabilities in order to protect United States interests in the Arctic region.
Through the semi-autonomous Greenland and the Faroe Islands, Denmark also has claim to a significant Exclusive Economic Zone in the Arctic region. Indeed, Denmark – like Russia – has laid claim to an extensive part of the Lomonosov ridge as its own, on the basis that the continental shelf off of Greenland extends from the top of Greenland to the North Pole. Denmark also assumed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in April of 2009. It plans to establish a joint-service Arctic Command, replete with an Arctic navy and with possibly air capabilities, out of its military base at Thule in Northern Greenland. The Danes will experience conflicts with the residents of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, who will expect a sizable share of natural resource proceeds given the autonomy Greenland has recently exercised under home rule. Showing initiative and a grasp of the region’s importance that the United States and Canada have not, Denmark has committed millions to creating detailed topographic maps of its claims by the time they come due to UNCLOS in 2014. They also have significant fishing interests in the region and recognize the need to effectively police mining and drilling operations in order to preserve native ecosystems.
The Norwegians are the fifth and final nation with a legitimate claim in the Arctic under UNCLOS. Norway's interests in the region are historical as well as physical. Indeed, Arctic explorer Roald Amundsen is one of the nation's few national heroes. In 2009, Norway became the first nation to have the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf approve its Arctic claims – extending its sovereignty by 235,000 square kilometers beyond the 200-mile EEZ. Norway shares a 120-mile Arctic border with Russia and is understandably wary of provoking its larger neighbor. The current regime has used Arctic tension to justify recent increases in military expenditures. Given that Norway's approved claim extends up to – but does not include – the North Pole, it is certain to face an increased burden as Arctic shipping increases at the same time that it benefits from new mineral and hydrocarbon discoveries. Currently, Norway seeks to promote cooperation rather than competition amongst the Arctic nations.
The remaining three nations with territory in the Arctic are Finland, Iceland and Sweden. None of the three stand to gain territory in the Arctic. Iceland has recently opened up its waters for oil drilling and in 2009 is more intent on recovering from the recent financial crisis than focusing on issues of Arctic sovereignty. In February of 2009, it was announced that Sweden and Finland would cooperate with Denmark and Norway in a Nordic security cooperative designed to protect their interests in the Arctic. For Finland, Iceland and Sweden, the biggest challenges going forward will be to maintain the quality of life for their peoples, protect the local environment and ensure that they are not put at a disadvantage by a new rush for resources in the Arctic.
Aside from the eight nations, fishermen, native peoples, mining, oil and shipping companies, environmental groups and non-governmental organizations such as the World Wildlife Foundation have significant interests in the Arctic region. These diverse interests' unanimous support in the United States for ratification of UNCLOS is indicative of UNCLOS’ status as a preeminent and critical piece of legislation that will be of increasing importance in the coming decades as final territorial disputes amongst the five Arctic nations with legitimate potential geographic claims under UNCLOS are settled. In the long term, any Arctic Treaty will have to protect the environment while providing for deep-sea mining and drilling; allow for indigenous peoples' rights; better outline legal obligations to search and rescue and disaster operations in the region; and reconcile actors who, on their own, might act as free-riders and act in an unsustainable and harmful manner.
The Russians, as the French, British and Americans, have long operated submarines in the Arctic region without announcing their presence. Additionally, Russian officials have expressed a belief that military security in the Arctic region is tantamount to Russian national security. Indeed, according to a 2009 document published on its national security council website, Moscow expects the Arctic to become its main resource base by 2020. Given that Arctic researchers funded by the European Union and the National Environmental Resource Council now think recent data indicates we should rely on models that predict the total melt of summer Arctic sea ice closer to 2030-2040 rather than the longer timeline that predicted total summer ice melt by 2080, Russia has a significant leg up on its competitors. As a resurgent nation a hard-line bargainer behind the scenes in Putin, significant interests in the Arctic region and economic as well as political clout, Russia is likely to be that toughest Arctic nation to negotiate with. After all, with geographic claims as yet not ratified by UNCLOS and an economy largely dependent on natural resources production for growth, Russia has much to lose and much to gain in the Arctic. By 2020 Russia plans to create a new Arctic division of the Russian armed forces so that it is prepared to do all it can to protect its own Arctic interests.
Canada has long asserted claims of sovereignty in the Arctic region, particularly within the Arctic Archipelago and along the Northwest Passage. Due to the wending of the coast and the islands in the Arctic Archipelago, it is necessary to use the straight baselines method to outline Canada's Arctic territorial sea. The straight baselines method is also employed by four of the five other claimant Arctic states and lent support in the Canadian case by historical claims of the Inuit people around the Amundsen Gulf and Lancaster Sound.
Despite claims of sovereignty, however, any pragmatic observer can easily discern that Canada has little capacity to enforce policies in its own territorial waters. In 1977, it instituted the NORDREG reporting system for ships transiting the area – but on a voluntary basis only. The Canadian navy has not regularly operated an icebreaker in the Arctic since the 1950s and most of the five icebreakers used by the Canadian Coast Guard are nearing the end of their 30-year useful service life. Canada, in effect, has no operational capabilities in Arctic waters covered by significant ice. It is unable to enforce environmental mandates, perform search and rescue in the region or even to effectively monitor shipping traffic. Canada signed UNCLOS in 2003, so it has only four years remaining – until 2013 – to submit its geographic claims in the Arctic. Since some of the passages between the islands of the Arctic Archipelago are about sixty miles wide and the territorial sea limit is only twelve miles wide, it is foreseeable that Canada might lose legal control over shipping in a region the Canadian national anthem refers to as “The True North, Strong and Free”. Canada has for too long neglected its Arctic waters, relying on the United States for anti-submarine warfare defense and not expanding operational capabilities that would allow it to enforce environmental and shipping regulations in the region. As such, even if the waters of the Arctic Archipelago are deemed internal waters, Canada might lose a degree of its territorial sovereignty in the region if it is established that the Northwest Passage or other routes connecting the high seas through the region are international straits. In any case, Canada’s lack of resource commitment to the Arctic leaves it with a weakened hand at the negotiating table.
The United States' is in an uneasy situation in the Arctic. Geographically speaking, the United States has the most of any country to gain via ratification of UNCLOS, not just in the Arctic but off its other coastlines. However, it has not done so. The Reagan administration opposed deep-sea mining and technology transfer provisions contained in the 1982 draft of UNCLOS; however, in 1994 revisions satisfactory to ex-Reagan administration officials were made. Despite a unanimous vote of confidence from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 2004 and support from groups as diverse as the Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, the Pew Oceans Commission, energy and environmental as well as fishing lobbies and the US military, a small group of radical right-wing legislators continue to stonewall ratification of UNCLOS on the ill-conceived premise that ratification would necessarily involve “the encroachment of UN rules on what they regard as the United States' rights as a sovereign nation.” This means that the United States’ rights at sea continue to lack international recognition until ratification and that the United States does not even have a seat at the negotiating table for any issue, including Arctic ones, presented to UNCLOS.
The United States' Arctic infrastructure is, as the US Coast Guard reflects, a decade of strong investment from capably meeting our responsibilities in the Arctic. As Commander Arthur Brooks states, though, it is easy to see why the Arctic will be important in the decades to come. The interest in exploiting the Arctic's mineral, oil and gas reserves is substantial: in the winter of 2008, leases in the Chukchi Sea were put up for bid. They were expected to fetch in the neighborhood of $600 million; instead, bids came in at $2.66 billion. The United States is an Arctic nation, with obligations to its native Arctic peoples. At present, the USCG cutter Healy is in the region mapping the ocean floor; however, it is the only one of the three US icebreakers is within its thirty year service time and the Coast Guard estimates it will take eight or more years – and $800 million – to build another icebreaker. Additionally, the Healy is only capable of operating at speeds of 3 knots in ice up to 4.5' thick, while the two other US icebreakers, the Polar Star and the Polar Sea, are theoretically capable of operating at 3 knots in up to 6' of ice. US Arctic infrastructure investment is low enough that the Polar Star was placed on indefinite non-operational status with a skeleton crew in Seattle after a gas turbine failed during a 2006 mission. Nearly four years later, the Coast Guard announced that it had resolved funding issues which will allows the Polar Star to return to operation for a limited period of time after repairs are completed in 2013. Additionally, the US must constantly have one of its two icebreakers committed to resupplying the Antarctic McMurdo station. As Admiral Thad Allen reflected in testimony to Congress, the average age of US High Endurance Cutters (which are not icebreakers) as of 2008 was 39 years old. If the United States wants to influence the rules or guidelines that could affect its gas hydrates outside the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone and take a leadership role in the management of the world's oceans, it needs a seat at the table of the Continental Shelf Commission, which would require ratification of UNCLOS. In short, the United States needs to sign UNCLOS and invest in its commitment to Arctic operational capabilities in order to protect United States interests in the Arctic region.
Through the semi-autonomous Greenland and the Faroe Islands, Denmark also has claim to a significant Exclusive Economic Zone in the Arctic region. Indeed, Denmark – like Russia – has laid claim to an extensive part of the Lomonosov ridge as its own, on the basis that the continental shelf off of Greenland extends from the top of Greenland to the North Pole. Denmark also assumed the chairmanship of the Arctic Council in April of 2009. It plans to establish a joint-service Arctic Command, replete with an Arctic navy and with possibly air capabilities, out of its military base at Thule in Northern Greenland. The Danes will experience conflicts with the residents of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, who will expect a sizable share of natural resource proceeds given the autonomy Greenland has recently exercised under home rule. Showing initiative and a grasp of the region’s importance that the United States and Canada have not, Denmark has committed millions to creating detailed topographic maps of its claims by the time they come due to UNCLOS in 2014. They also have significant fishing interests in the region and recognize the need to effectively police mining and drilling operations in order to preserve native ecosystems.
The Norwegians are the fifth and final nation with a legitimate claim in the Arctic under UNCLOS. Norway's interests in the region are historical as well as physical. Indeed, Arctic explorer Roald Amundsen is one of the nation's few national heroes. In 2009, Norway became the first nation to have the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf approve its Arctic claims – extending its sovereignty by 235,000 square kilometers beyond the 200-mile EEZ. Norway shares a 120-mile Arctic border with Russia and is understandably wary of provoking its larger neighbor. The current regime has used Arctic tension to justify recent increases in military expenditures. Given that Norway's approved claim extends up to – but does not include – the North Pole, it is certain to face an increased burden as Arctic shipping increases at the same time that it benefits from new mineral and hydrocarbon discoveries. Currently, Norway seeks to promote cooperation rather than competition amongst the Arctic nations.
The remaining three nations with territory in the Arctic are Finland, Iceland and Sweden. None of the three stand to gain territory in the Arctic. Iceland has recently opened up its waters for oil drilling and in 2009 is more intent on recovering from the recent financial crisis than focusing on issues of Arctic sovereignty. In February of 2009, it was announced that Sweden and Finland would cooperate with Denmark and Norway in a Nordic security cooperative designed to protect their interests in the Arctic. For Finland, Iceland and Sweden, the biggest challenges going forward will be to maintain the quality of life for their peoples, protect the local environment and ensure that they are not put at a disadvantage by a new rush for resources in the Arctic.
Aside from the eight nations, fishermen, native peoples, mining, oil and shipping companies, environmental groups and non-governmental organizations such as the World Wildlife Foundation have significant interests in the Arctic region. These diverse interests' unanimous support in the United States for ratification of UNCLOS is indicative of UNCLOS’ status as a preeminent and critical piece of legislation that will be of increasing importance in the coming decades as final territorial disputes amongst the five Arctic nations with legitimate potential geographic claims under UNCLOS are settled. In the long term, any Arctic Treaty will have to protect the environment while providing for deep-sea mining and drilling; allow for indigenous peoples' rights; better outline legal obligations to search and rescue and disaster operations in the region; and reconcile actors who, on their own, might act as free-riders and act in an unsustainable and harmful manner.
Evidence for a Cooperative Agreement: the Antarctic Regime
The Antarctic Treaty, which arose from the success of the 1957-1958 Geophysical Year, is unique in that it is a joint governance regime for the only continent on the planet with its own continental shelf but no indigenous human population. Indeed, about ninety-five percent of Antarctica is covered by a freshwater ice sheet that is, on average, more than a mile thick: the continent has no native human inhabitants. Antarctica has the highest average elevation of any continent; it is also the coldest, and one of the most environmentally fragile, regions on the planet. Ringed by the ferocious Southern Ocean, mean sustained winter winds in the Antarctic often reach over sixty miles an hour. In sum, the wild and unpredictable weather of the Antarctic makes the Arctic climate appears relatively mild—which makes the Arctic relatively more appealing to shipping companies.
On a legal basis, the Arctic and the Antarctic are treated as fundamentally different entities by the international legal regime. Unlike the Antarctic, the Arctic has been inhabited for thousands of years by indigenous peoples. In addition, the Antarctic lies on its own continental shelf while the Arctic region is an extension of the continental shelves of the Arctic nations. Thus, under the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regime sovereign nations have geographic claims to territorial sovereignty in the Arctic while they do not have geographic claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.
In short, the Arctic is a region while Antarctica is a continent. The precedent of American and Russian Arctic submarine operations, hydrocarbon drilling and recent increased Russian Arctic militarism demonstrate that the Arctic will not, as the Antarctic, be forever exclusively dedicated to peaceful purposes. However, the Antarctic Treaty holds a number of important precedents that might be incorporated into an international Arctic governance regime.
First, the Antarctic Treaty represents an international intergovernmental environmental regime. Nuclear explosions and nuclear waste disposal are explicitly prohibited by the Antarctic Treaty. Given the Russian and Americans’ documented history of nuclear dumping as well as extensive nuclear submarine activity in the Arctic, similar nuclear dumping and nuclear weapons use guidelines in the Arctic would help to protect the Arctic marine environment and Arctic peoples while potentially reducing levels of Arctic militarism.
Second, the Antarctic Treaty emphasizes open exchange of scientific information, observations and results as well as exchange of scientific personnel in the Antarctic region “to permit maximum economy and efficiency of operations”. Scientific information and personnel exchange in the Arctic could help develop an international integrated ice regime system, lead to more accurate measurement of ice flow threats and facilitate the development of international scientific institutions to study problems specific to the fragile Arctic environment. Such issues might include monitoring time trends in ice formation and coverage, precipitation, storm and other weather information and information on pollutants released in and carried into the region.
Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty also provides for “facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection”. This includes aerial observation permitted at any time by Contracting Parties and the openness at all times to inspection of stations, installations and equipment as well as ships and aircraft at point of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel. While a similar highly cooperative system is unlikely to develop in the nationalized and more polarized Arctic, increased transparency with regards to nation-states’ Arctic operations could soothe national security concerns. Transparency would also encourage Arctic players to employ heightened environmental safeguards and lead to a more demilitarized as well as cleaner Arctic. Indeed, countries and corporations might choose to lead by example, facilitating the development of best practices in the region. In addition, such an open inspection system would function as a deterrent to anyone looking to engage in illegal smuggling activities—for instance of weapons, nuclear material or humans—through the Arctic.
The Antarctic Treaty also provides an important framework for an environmental regime that governs native ecosystems, including local flora and fauna. Applicable to the area south of 60° South latitude, the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora protect native mammals, birds and plants “indigenous to the Antarctic or occurring there through natural agencies of dispersal”. Except when granted permits in case of providing indispensable food for dogs or men, providing specimens for scientific study or scientific information or providing specimens for museums, zoological gardens, or other educational or cultural institutions or uses, it is prohibited to kill, wound, capture or molest native mammals or birds in Antarctica. In addition, it is unlawful to allow dogs to run free or operate vehicles in unnecessary proximity (within two hundred meters) to bird and seal concentrations. It is prohibited to fly or land helicopters or other aircraft in a manner that would unnecessarily disturb bird or seal populations unless necessary to establish, supply and operate scientific stations. Governments are instructed to take reasonable measures to prevent pollution of nearby waters. Within Specially Protected Areas, except in the case of a specially issued scientific permit, it is prohibited to drive any vehicle or to collect any native plant. Except in the case of food and under controlled conditions, no non-indigenous plant or animal species are allowed into Antarctica. In addition, reasonable precautions to prevent non-native parasites and diseases from entering the region must be taken.
To some extent, each of these measures could be similarly applied in the Arctic. Because the Arctic is not itself a continent, restrictions on plane and helicopter operations would probably occur at a national level except in international airspace, although an international agreement could tax or limit either average, per flight or aggregate pollution by air traffic. An international organization to disseminate national fisheries management policies could broadly disseminate fisheries policies. Since national Arctic marine ecosystems are inextricably linked by the Arctic Ocean, the free exchange of information concerning fish stocks and co-regulation of fisheries in order to ensure sustainable catch limits would facilitate sustainable Arctic fisheries management. Even if Canada fishes, for instance, at what is considered a sustainable level, overfishing in Norway or Russia could throw off the balance of the interconnected marine ecosystem.
Non-native marine (and land-based) species will migrate into the Arctic as ocean water warms. However, international restrictions on and penalties for the accidental or purposeful introduction of harmful and non-native plant or animal species to the region can be adopted. National regimes can regulate land-based pollution entering the Arctic waters while an international regime could establish shipping guidelines designed to prevent pollution originating from ocean activities such as vessel shipping or oil and natural gas drilling.
One highly relevant application of the Antarctic Treaty to the Arctic is the Antarctic Treaty’s Appendix II, Article XI concerning ships’ crews. Article XI provides that governments whose expeditions use ships sailing under flags of nationalities other than its own observe, as far as reasonable, the measures of the treaty. In the case of the Arctic, this could be applied with increased scope over governments whose corporations use expeditions sailing under flags of other nationalities to increase accountability amongst vessel owners flying a Flag of Convenience. Indeed, such a regime would encourage increased shipping oversight by Arctic as well as non-Arctic players by increasing their legal responsibilities to an Arctic governance regime. Additionally, Annex V of the Protocol on Environmental Protection outlines the legal basis for liability as well as the venue and process in which this should occur (under the national court of the pursuing party subject to domestic law) and similar guidelines could be applied in the Arctic.
The Antarctic Treaty also includes provisions to protect endangered species. For instance, the Antarctic Treaty’s Appendix III addresses the need for specific provisions protecting Antarctic seals. Appendix III could serve as a template for a similar treaty protecting threatened Arctic species such as the beluga whale and polar bear. Polar bear hunts, for instance, are currently big money for Inuit hunters, since big game hunters will pay around US$35,000 to participate in a polar bear hunt. Protection of these animals’ natural habitat would be central to any such protected species agreement; however, negative externalities such as declining sea ice levels and rising seawater temperatures would complicate the process of enforcing an agreement that protects the animals’ natural habitat. Currently, the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears and their Habitats protects the three largest polar-bear denning areas, one each in Russia, Svalbard and Canada, but polar bears’ offshore feeding grounds lack the protection of their breeding grounds. Other important native species, such as reindeer and caribou, would also benefit from environmental protection regimes.
The 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty was a commitment by the Contracting Parties to the treaty to “commit themselves to the comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems and … designate Antarctica as a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science.” Today, the Contracting Parties remain committed to ensuring this vision: the mineral, oil and natural gas reserves in the Antarctic will remain untouched for the foreseeable future except for scientific purposes. While no single nation has adopted a policy stance proposing that Arctic resources remain untouched in the same fashion, the Protocol on Environmental Protection does provide a useful example of an international management regime that could to some extent be copied in the Arctic.
Namely, the Protocol on Environmental Protection provides annexes to deal with the issues of waste disposal and marine pollution as well as the preservation of protected areas and Antarctic fauna and flora. In general, countries are responsible to the maximum extent practicable for removing Antarctic waste to their own country, including sewage and nuclear waste. Waste management plans are annually reviewed and updated. However, raw sewage is permitted to be disposed by vessels in the Antarctic on a limited basis provided they are at least twelve nautical miles offshore (large quantities of such waste must be treated by maceration prior to disposal). This raw sewage provision would be an unacceptable standard to allow in the Arctic, particularly given the increasing number of cruise ships visiting the region. Discharge from ships of oil, noxious chemical substances, grey water and other liquids that may be harmful, as well as garbage and synthetic products such as fishing nets to the environment is generally prohibited in the Antarctic, except in the case of disaster when reasonable precautions must be taken to prevent or minimize the pollution. Ships owned and operated by the state such as warships or naval auxiliary vessels are subject to the requirements of the annex, however, only as far as is practicable when engaged in government non-commercial duty. These successfully implemented measures could serve as precedent for and the basis of cooperation on similar issues in the Arctic region.
Finally, the Antarctic regime contains special clauses that limit activity within Specially Protected Areas and Specially Managed Areas that are deemed of vital environmental or historical importance. In the Arctic, such areas might include whale breeding grounds in Lancaster Sound and offshore polar bear feeding grounds. A regime modeled after the Antarctic Treaty that requires permits to operate in well-defined historically or ecologically important areas of the Arctic would be an important step towards preserving local ecosystems. This could help protect indigenous rights and better monitor and protect fragile Arctic ecosystems.
On a legal basis, the Arctic and the Antarctic are treated as fundamentally different entities by the international legal regime. Unlike the Antarctic, the Arctic has been inhabited for thousands of years by indigenous peoples. In addition, the Antarctic lies on its own continental shelf while the Arctic region is an extension of the continental shelves of the Arctic nations. Thus, under the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regime sovereign nations have geographic claims to territorial sovereignty in the Arctic while they do not have geographic claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.
In short, the Arctic is a region while Antarctica is a continent. The precedent of American and Russian Arctic submarine operations, hydrocarbon drilling and recent increased Russian Arctic militarism demonstrate that the Arctic will not, as the Antarctic, be forever exclusively dedicated to peaceful purposes. However, the Antarctic Treaty holds a number of important precedents that might be incorporated into an international Arctic governance regime.
First, the Antarctic Treaty represents an international intergovernmental environmental regime. Nuclear explosions and nuclear waste disposal are explicitly prohibited by the Antarctic Treaty. Given the Russian and Americans’ documented history of nuclear dumping as well as extensive nuclear submarine activity in the Arctic, similar nuclear dumping and nuclear weapons use guidelines in the Arctic would help to protect the Arctic marine environment and Arctic peoples while potentially reducing levels of Arctic militarism.
Second, the Antarctic Treaty emphasizes open exchange of scientific information, observations and results as well as exchange of scientific personnel in the Antarctic region “to permit maximum economy and efficiency of operations”. Scientific information and personnel exchange in the Arctic could help develop an international integrated ice regime system, lead to more accurate measurement of ice flow threats and facilitate the development of international scientific institutions to study problems specific to the fragile Arctic environment. Such issues might include monitoring time trends in ice formation and coverage, precipitation, storm and other weather information and information on pollutants released in and carried into the region.
Article VII of the Antarctic Treaty also provides for “facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection”. This includes aerial observation permitted at any time by Contracting Parties and the openness at all times to inspection of stations, installations and equipment as well as ships and aircraft at point of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel. While a similar highly cooperative system is unlikely to develop in the nationalized and more polarized Arctic, increased transparency with regards to nation-states’ Arctic operations could soothe national security concerns. Transparency would also encourage Arctic players to employ heightened environmental safeguards and lead to a more demilitarized as well as cleaner Arctic. Indeed, countries and corporations might choose to lead by example, facilitating the development of best practices in the region. In addition, such an open inspection system would function as a deterrent to anyone looking to engage in illegal smuggling activities—for instance of weapons, nuclear material or humans—through the Arctic.
The Antarctic Treaty also provides an important framework for an environmental regime that governs native ecosystems, including local flora and fauna. Applicable to the area south of 60° South latitude, the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora protect native mammals, birds and plants “indigenous to the Antarctic or occurring there through natural agencies of dispersal”. Except when granted permits in case of providing indispensable food for dogs or men, providing specimens for scientific study or scientific information or providing specimens for museums, zoological gardens, or other educational or cultural institutions or uses, it is prohibited to kill, wound, capture or molest native mammals or birds in Antarctica. In addition, it is unlawful to allow dogs to run free or operate vehicles in unnecessary proximity (within two hundred meters) to bird and seal concentrations. It is prohibited to fly or land helicopters or other aircraft in a manner that would unnecessarily disturb bird or seal populations unless necessary to establish, supply and operate scientific stations. Governments are instructed to take reasonable measures to prevent pollution of nearby waters. Within Specially Protected Areas, except in the case of a specially issued scientific permit, it is prohibited to drive any vehicle or to collect any native plant. Except in the case of food and under controlled conditions, no non-indigenous plant or animal species are allowed into Antarctica. In addition, reasonable precautions to prevent non-native parasites and diseases from entering the region must be taken.
To some extent, each of these measures could be similarly applied in the Arctic. Because the Arctic is not itself a continent, restrictions on plane and helicopter operations would probably occur at a national level except in international airspace, although an international agreement could tax or limit either average, per flight or aggregate pollution by air traffic. An international organization to disseminate national fisheries management policies could broadly disseminate fisheries policies. Since national Arctic marine ecosystems are inextricably linked by the Arctic Ocean, the free exchange of information concerning fish stocks and co-regulation of fisheries in order to ensure sustainable catch limits would facilitate sustainable Arctic fisheries management. Even if Canada fishes, for instance, at what is considered a sustainable level, overfishing in Norway or Russia could throw off the balance of the interconnected marine ecosystem.
Non-native marine (and land-based) species will migrate into the Arctic as ocean water warms. However, international restrictions on and penalties for the accidental or purposeful introduction of harmful and non-native plant or animal species to the region can be adopted. National regimes can regulate land-based pollution entering the Arctic waters while an international regime could establish shipping guidelines designed to prevent pollution originating from ocean activities such as vessel shipping or oil and natural gas drilling.
One highly relevant application of the Antarctic Treaty to the Arctic is the Antarctic Treaty’s Appendix II, Article XI concerning ships’ crews. Article XI provides that governments whose expeditions use ships sailing under flags of nationalities other than its own observe, as far as reasonable, the measures of the treaty. In the case of the Arctic, this could be applied with increased scope over governments whose corporations use expeditions sailing under flags of other nationalities to increase accountability amongst vessel owners flying a Flag of Convenience. Indeed, such a regime would encourage increased shipping oversight by Arctic as well as non-Arctic players by increasing their legal responsibilities to an Arctic governance regime. Additionally, Annex V of the Protocol on Environmental Protection outlines the legal basis for liability as well as the venue and process in which this should occur (under the national court of the pursuing party subject to domestic law) and similar guidelines could be applied in the Arctic.
The Antarctic Treaty also includes provisions to protect endangered species. For instance, the Antarctic Treaty’s Appendix III addresses the need for specific provisions protecting Antarctic seals. Appendix III could serve as a template for a similar treaty protecting threatened Arctic species such as the beluga whale and polar bear. Polar bear hunts, for instance, are currently big money for Inuit hunters, since big game hunters will pay around US$35,000 to participate in a polar bear hunt. Protection of these animals’ natural habitat would be central to any such protected species agreement; however, negative externalities such as declining sea ice levels and rising seawater temperatures would complicate the process of enforcing an agreement that protects the animals’ natural habitat. Currently, the 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears and their Habitats protects the three largest polar-bear denning areas, one each in Russia, Svalbard and Canada, but polar bears’ offshore feeding grounds lack the protection of their breeding grounds. Other important native species, such as reindeer and caribou, would also benefit from environmental protection regimes.
The 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty was a commitment by the Contracting Parties to the treaty to “commit themselves to the comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems and … designate Antarctica as a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science.” Today, the Contracting Parties remain committed to ensuring this vision: the mineral, oil and natural gas reserves in the Antarctic will remain untouched for the foreseeable future except for scientific purposes. While no single nation has adopted a policy stance proposing that Arctic resources remain untouched in the same fashion, the Protocol on Environmental Protection does provide a useful example of an international management regime that could to some extent be copied in the Arctic.
Namely, the Protocol on Environmental Protection provides annexes to deal with the issues of waste disposal and marine pollution as well as the preservation of protected areas and Antarctic fauna and flora. In general, countries are responsible to the maximum extent practicable for removing Antarctic waste to their own country, including sewage and nuclear waste. Waste management plans are annually reviewed and updated. However, raw sewage is permitted to be disposed by vessels in the Antarctic on a limited basis provided they are at least twelve nautical miles offshore (large quantities of such waste must be treated by maceration prior to disposal). This raw sewage provision would be an unacceptable standard to allow in the Arctic, particularly given the increasing number of cruise ships visiting the region. Discharge from ships of oil, noxious chemical substances, grey water and other liquids that may be harmful, as well as garbage and synthetic products such as fishing nets to the environment is generally prohibited in the Antarctic, except in the case of disaster when reasonable precautions must be taken to prevent or minimize the pollution. Ships owned and operated by the state such as warships or naval auxiliary vessels are subject to the requirements of the annex, however, only as far as is practicable when engaged in government non-commercial duty. These successfully implemented measures could serve as precedent for and the basis of cooperation on similar issues in the Arctic region.
Finally, the Antarctic regime contains special clauses that limit activity within Specially Protected Areas and Specially Managed Areas that are deemed of vital environmental or historical importance. In the Arctic, such areas might include whale breeding grounds in Lancaster Sound and offshore polar bear feeding grounds. A regime modeled after the Antarctic Treaty that requires permits to operate in well-defined historically or ecologically important areas of the Arctic would be an important step towards preserving local ecosystems. This could help protect indigenous rights and better monitor and protect fragile Arctic ecosystems.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
