Explaining Regime Formation

Regime theory assumes that international regimes are capable of affecting the behavior of international actors such as states and corporations. International regimes are accompanied by compliance issues: actors must be convinced that they are not disproportionately bearing the costs of or suffering from a regime. An effective regime, though, establishes the expectations around which an actor shapes decision making procedures. The Antarctic Treaty has effectively provided a decision- and expectation-shaping regime in the Arctic for close to fifty years. Indeed, as Peter J. Beck describes the Antarctic Treaty: “Most commentators interpret the treaty as bringing stability, or rather preserving the stable state of affairs cultivated during the International Geo-physical Year (IGY) of 1957-8, to a region which had proved not only a long-standing source of international rivalry…but also an escalating cause of inter-governmental, even super-power, tension during the decade or so preceding 1959.”  An Arctic Treaty could similarly distill tension in and help to preserve the Arctic; the world does not need a new strategic area to be struggled for on the international scene.

In Global Environmental Politics, Chasek et al. describe a regime as a system of norms and rules specified by a multilateral agreement among the relevant states to regulate national actions on a specific issue or set of interrelated issues.  To provide incentive to engage in negotiations, a regime must have positive total expected value and positive expected value to each state. Public opinion is a powerful actor in this process, providing an incentive for states to reject the status quo and to participate in a regime created through multilateral negotiations. In the Arctic, Arctic Council mandates may represent the sort of soft law, or nonbinding agreement, that Chasek et al. consider a regime because the mandates can influence state behavior. However, these soft mandates do not represent a strict and binding legal regime and do not constitute an equitable, effective and sustainable regional resource management regime.

Chasek et al. outline four main theoretical approaches to the formation of regimes. First, they discuss the structural regime, which falls into two subcategories. In the first type of structural regime, military and economic powers coerce other states to participate in the regime. In the second type of structural regime, military and economic power is used benevolently to create public goods.

Second, there are game theory regimes. In this regime, the outcome is either zero-sum or non-zero sum. Game theory regimes are assumed to be negotiated by rationale actors who cannot act outside the sphere of other actors’ influence. Unfortunately, in either small or large environmental regimes formed as game theory regimes veto power will remain. This is because any one actor who refuses to adhere to the regime can effectively destroy the collective efforts of the other actors.

The third regime type is an institutional bargaining model. Under institutional bargaining, states are ultimately concerned with economic growth and national security. Therefore, they create institutions to protect resources for future generations. These institutions in turn guide behavioral expectations and norms within the scope of the environmental regime.

Fourth, Chasek et al. identify an epistemic communities model of regime formation in which transnational boundaries formed among a scientific and technological elite influence regime formation. Such a regime, like that formed in Antarctica, requires a high degree of agreement on issues among the scientific community. Even then, private or state interests may hold this community hostage and thus minimize its influence.

Which one of these four theories explains how an Arctic regime might form? There are elements of three of the four theories of regime formation in place. First, the Arctic is a non-zero sum arena in which all states could unequivocally benefit from a strong environmental protection regime. Other states, such as China, might have veto power but effective regime enforcement and activity monitoring can minimize this risk of external veto power. As Chasek et al. state, the structural theory does not apply to environmental regimes. Certainly, this is the case in the Arctic. While Russia and the United States are clearly the dominant military and economic forces in the region, neither has demonstrated a willingness to act for public good and neither appears to derive a large enough individual benefit to coerce other states to participate in an environmental regime.

The epistemic communities model provides the best launching point for an Arctic environmental regime. Indeed, there is a high degree of consensus among scientists that ice melt is occurring and that the region needs to be further protected in order to maintain it for future generations. Scientists’ findings could influence the court of public opinion and push states to consider a cooperative regional resource management regime. This political momentum could carry the regime through an institutional bargaining procedure, a process the Arctic states have already embraced with the formation of the Arctic Council and the Arctic Council working groups responsible for creating non-binding recommendations. In sum, the negotiation of an Arctic environmental regime might at different times draw from different models of regime formation. At points, a regime will be pushed by the scientific community. At other times, the collective interests of the states in participating in a positive-sum game that can also garner political favor in the court of public opinion might keep negotiations going. Finally, traditional institutional bargaining aimed at creating a set of norms and regulations governed by institutions that can effectively protect the region for generations to come will certainly be one characteristic of any regime negotiations.