Conclusion

Policy decisions in the Arctic can neither be considered in isolation or wait until the rush is on: the Arctic region needs to be protected and managed. In large part, a cooperative Arctic regime would be an environmental protection regime, designed to ensure that the region is developed in a sustainable fashion and that risks are accounted for when possible. Creating a legal regime should be undertaken now, not twenty or thirty years down the road. Contextual factors should drive nations to coordinate: there is only one chance to protect regional fisheries, endangered species such as the polar bear and whale breeding grounds in Lancaster Sound. Implementing a vessel piloting system in the Arctic will take time and should be begun as soon as possible. Case studies of Antarctic waterborne tourism should be conducted to identify best policies for the Arctic region, including limitations on both the number of tourist vessels and passengers as well as strict hull build specifications. Regionally integrated ice and hull regimes as well as a centrally controlled ship processing and monitoring system would provide better oversight of shipping in the region. In the end, however, these systems need to be backed by strong support from local Coast Guards. Such support will require new investment in Arctic-class icebreakers, in particular reinvestment by the United States in its icebreaking fleet. Russia has already demonstrated its commitment to rebuilding its Arctic fleet and Canada lacks the resources to physically patrol its entire Arctic coastline, so the United States must pick up the slack. A regional treaty system would address holes in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, minimize development’s impact on the region and through increased dialogue and information sharing between nations decrease the likelihood of military confrontation. Creating an effective regime to govern Arctic waters will ensure that the Arctic is well-protected, thus promoting an intergenerational transfer of the region’s wealth. In spite of the other-minded 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, a regional regime provides too many benefits to member nations and the Arctic region to be cast aside as a political impossibility. In reality, to protect the Arctic from excessive speculation in investment vehicles and environmental disaster the nations of the world need to create a regional management regime. Almost five decades ago, nations around the globe came together to protect the world’s other pole, and today circumstances again call for historic cooperation.

Denmark

Denmark, which has a stake in the region through Greenland, should explore the oil and natural gas reserves off of Greenland. This could bring additional revenue to the 55,000 residents of Greenland as well as to the Danish government. However, the Danish government should approach this with the knowledge that reserves would be expensive to extract and the overall likelihood of any large oil, gas or mineral windfall is small. Denmark should also promote itself as a haven for scientific research, committing to the region diplomatically and scientifically while keeping costs to a minimum because it appears to have little to gain through high levels of investment. In particular, Denmark should not consider purchasing icebreakers.

Finland and Sweden

Finland and Sweden are two Arctic nations with little negotiating power – neither has new territory to claim – who have similar interests moving forward. Primarily, they should encourage the implementation of strong vessel monitoring systems. This can be accomplished through a vocal presence at regional forums, for instance meetings of the Arctic Council, and a surface presence in the region. Sweden and Finland should also work jointly to ensure that shipping rules are safe and effective so that the two nations are not harmed by negative externalities that might stem from unsafe Arctic shipping.

Norway

Through a commitment to increased Nordic security cooperation as outlined in the Stoltenberg Report, Norway has made it clear that it does not intend to take its role as an Arctic nation lightly - a wise policy stance given Norway’s proximity to Russia. In the future, Norway will be charged with protecting its own sovereignty from Russian infringement, particularly in the Svalbard Archipelago, where Russia maintains that it has fishing rights in Norwegian waters. Norway needs to continue to focus on regional policy and security cooperation while ensuring that increased offshore and onshore oil and gas operations do not result in environmental disasters. It must also effectively police its fisheries and because Northern Sea Route shipping will often pass through Norwegian waters should investigate expansion of its icebreaking capabilities (currently, Norway has two ice-class vessels), perhaps in conjunction with Russia. As a nation where oil and natural gas extraction occur in the same region fishermen depend on for their livelihood, strong policymaking and enforcement can help Norway emerge as a model of environmental stewardship.

Iceland

Iceland has no new territory to claim in the Arctic, no navy or air force to speak of and a Coast Guard staffed by only three patrol boats, the newest of which was built in 1975. Iceland’s priorities in the Arctic are to maintain its fishing industry through effective regulation and to promote sustainable practices and scientific cooperation. Effective policy enforcement in Iceland’s Exclusive Economic Zone will require new investments in the Icelandic Coast Guard to ensure that the fleet, already minimal, does not fall into disrepair. Iceland should also pursue additional revenue from seabed oil and natural gas leases where it is ecologically sensible.

Canada

Canada claims sovereignty over the second-largest Arctic coastline (Russia has the longest) yet is plagued by a lack of fiscal commitment to the region, exemplified by the country’s inability to follow through on a 1987 pledge to create a Polar Class 8 icebreaker. In the future, Canada should maintain a minimal surface presence in the Arctic region in order to assert sovereignty while forcing other nations to bear the cost of opening the Northwest Passage. Given Canada’s status as a Far North nation, the government should also encourage international scientific cooperation, particularly on warming of the Arctic, changing ecosystems, emissions of greenhouse gases from melting permafrost and these changes’ effects on indigenous people. Like the United States, Canada needs to make the Arctic an integral part of national policy rather than an afterthought. It should build and then seek to profit from new northern ports, including building rail lines to ship goods into the now inaccessible Canadian north. Canada will not be able to stop Arctic development, so it must seek to control and participate in the region’s growth.

United States

The United States should awaken to its role as an Arctic nation. If the country expects to use the Northwest Passage more extensively, it must build more icebreakers. National security interests should drive politicians to seek broad international demilitarization commitments that will maximize the effectiveness of security expenditures in the region. To establish legal precedent for the country’s claim that the Northwest Passage is an international strait with right of innocent passage and overflight for aircraft, the United States should do everything possible to facilitate the safe and expeditious development of shipping through the Northwest Passage. In addition, as a world power and scientific leader the United States can be a leader on environmental protection issues and provide scientific support. Finally, the United States can use its extensive information network, including its Arctic radar system, and bargaining power to aid in information exchange and gathering as well as diplomacy.

Russia

Russia, as the only nation with nuclear icebreakers and a stated commitment to turning the Arctic into its main resource base by 2020, should continue to build icebreakers capable of operating deep in Arctic territory. This will help to facilitate mineral, oil and gas development in its territory and enable shipping to occur on a more regular basis. In the near-term, Russia could also provide icebreaking services in non-Russian waters at a fee, for instance in the Northwest Passage. Russia should increase transparency about its Arctic operations in order to quell international concerns about its ambitions and commit to the effective disposal of spent nuclear fuel. In the future, Russia might serve as a model for monetizing and effectively policing northern sea routes while the country could utilize its icebreaking knowledge to gain a larger share of shipbuilding contracts for ice-capable vessels. Due to national security concerns, it would be surprising if Russia decided to allow its shipyards to build nuclear-powered icebreakers for foreign nations.

National Futures in the Arctic: Overview

Under a new regional environmental management framework, the Arctic nations would continue to have different priorities and roles in the Arctic region on a case by case basis. For some, like Russia, natural resource extraction will remain a central short- and long-term objective. For others, like Iceland, effective enforcement of fisheries policies in their own and contiguous waters will be more important to the national economic outlook. In light of this, national priorities moving forward are briefly outlined below.

Icebreakers: a Necessary Investment?

One major strategic issue for the Arctic nations surrounds future plans to build cost-intensive icebreakers. Indeed, a modern polar icebreaker costs well over one billion dollars. Icebreakers are a politically sensitive topic and have design and construction lead times of eight to ten years. Given that climate scientists now favor models which indicate total summer ice melt by 2030-2040, one might question the logic of new investments in icebreaking capabilities. Of course, whether to invest in new icebreakers is a politically charged issue and policy outcomes will differ on a nation-by-nation basis. However, some basic conclusions are outlined below.

On the whole, icebreakers represent a large investment for a minimal surface presence. They are slow, carry relatively large crews and are expensive to operate and maintain. Non-nuclear (in 2010, this implies non-Russian) icebreakers are limited in range by fuel considerations and can put to sea for only a few months at a time. In addition, icebreakers represent an easy surface target in the event of war. It would be impossible for even a sizable fleet of icebreakers to entirely patrol activity in the vast Arctic region.

On the other hand, icebreakers do serve a variety of roles in the polar world. Their very presence is a deterrent to rogue activity, for instance unauthorized Arctic voyages by non-Arctic class Chinese tankers. Icebreakers serve as scientific research platforms and thus represent crucial pieces of the global information network in the Arctic. Icebreakers have the potential to dramatically reduce the risk of shipping in the Arctic by providing icebreaking services to ships in transit. They can likewise help to keep Arctic shipping routes open for a longer season than might otherwise be possible. In the event of a serious environmental disaster, a well-positioned icebreaker could be the only surface vessel in a position to respond and provide ground support. Icebreakers can also work to enforce fisheries regulations and regularly inspect offshore oil and gas platforms to ensure compliance with best practices.

This paper advocates, therefore, that new icebreaker construction is in the case of the larger and better endowed Arctic nations, namely Russia and the United States, warranted. However, icebreakers should be seen as just one piece of the global Arctic infrastructure. Well-developed monitoring infrastructure, such as a comprehensive radar network, regular area overflights and a central command system, should complement icebreakers. Icebreakers should be used mainly for scientific and shipping support with occasional regulation enforcement duties when necessary. In even the most optimistic scenario, it would be 2018 before the United States could fully construct a polar class icebreaker. With full summer ice melt predicted by 2030-2040, more research into the type and number of vessels warranted is needed before such a significant investment is made. However, any country planning to build an icebreaker in the future should begin immediately to ensure that the vessel is put to proper use for the bulk of its service life. Tankers engaged in Arctic transit are a different matter entirely and construction should be mandated to Arctic-class specifications for all such vessels to minimize the risk of environmental disaster.

Search, Rescue and Environmental Cleanup

Finally, there are the issues of search, rescue and environmental cleanup capacities. Unfortunately, as the Exxon Valdez disaster demonstrates, it is difficult to clean up even a small environmental disaster. In the Arctic, where there are few deepwater ports and severe weather as well as remoteness make operating conditions at best difficult, the scope of disaster cleanup tasks is magnified multifold. Indeed, as the recent wreck of the Chinese carrier Shen Neng 1 on the Great Barrier Reef demonstrates, officials and salvage crews are often helpless to do more than try and minimize the damage after an oil spill or other disaster has occurred.  Preventive measures, therefore, such as required regional accredited pilots, strong construction standards, a comprehensive ice regime, good vessel monitoring and high levels of precaution in granting vessel clearance, are likely to provide the best insurance again disaster per dollar spent. The Arctic nations should, however, investigate the creation of a joint disaster response facility staffed by aircraft and waterborne vessels with cleanup capabilities. To ensure quick response time, each nation and shippers themselves should be required to pay into a disaster relief pool on a fee basis (annually for nations) that would be used to cover operating expenses in the event of disasters.

Search and rescue operations, on the other hand, can be handled through the enhancement of current operations. In particular, search and rescue operations should focus on tourist vessels, commercial and non-commercial, since operators of cargo vessels, oil platforms and other non-tourist commercial vessels frequently remain on site even after a disaster occurs. Therefore, the Arctic Treaty should identify key strategic locations for northern Coast Guard bases. In countries without a strong Coast Guard infrastructure, such as Iceland, the eight nations should work together to build an operational search and rescue base. Taken together, the national bases should have the scope to cover disasters across the Arctic region. However, if a large tourist vessel is stricken in the region even a fleet of rescue helicopters would be unlikely to be able to offload all passengers efficiently. In light of this, Arctic vessels should be required to carry extra emergency supplies, including drysuits for all passengers, to ensure that passengers have the ability to survive an extended rescue operation. Cost-sharing for search and rescue operations will be a matter of contention, with the most likely compromise a system in which nations, the rescued and their insurers all bear some portion of the costs. Nonetheless, if waterborne activity within the Arctic is to increase then sophisticated search and rescue capabilities will be necessary. Clearly, commercial aircraft operation over the open waters of the Arctic would pose another issue entirely, but the infrastructure for such a system would be largely similar.

Such initiatives in the Arctic might be politically unfavorable because of their short-term costs. However, in the long term these policies represent a small investment with the potential for dramatic savings. Initiatives to keep the Arctic a secure and conflict-free zone will save money by reducing national defense budgets for Arctic nations. Making the region a no go, no dump zone for military nuclear operation will save money on future clean-ups and help to preserve the ecological health of the region as well as the health of its human inhabitants. Funding future scientific research will allow global leaders to make more complete, information-based policy decisions. Strict enforcement of shipping regulations such as the hull and ice regimes will reduce the chance of disaster, thus serving as cheap risk insurance. Strong fisheries, farming and forestry management policies will ensure that future generations are able to draw on regional resources, thus promoting intergenerational wealth transfers and long-term economic stability. In addition, an effective negotiated multilateral environmental regime in the Arctic would send a message to the world that the Arctic nations are committed to capitalizing on their one chance to protect this valuable ecological region.

Tourism

Higher tourist traffic will be a two-edged sword for the Arctic regions. With the new money tourism brings into the region will come environmental hazards and other concerns. Tourist boats should be required to adhere to the same hull and ice regimes as all other vessels. In addition, tourist vessels should pay into a disaster relief fund annually to help offset the cost of any sort of search and rescue or environmental cleanup operation that might stem from their presence. Tourism should be strictly limited to a certain number of vessels or passengers per year, with the quota perhaps increasingly annually from a small base to an eventual cap in order to develop best practices through experience. This would help to ensure that the region is not overdeveloped and does not become overly dependent on tourism revenues.

Prohibiting all Hazardous Waste Disposal

Beyond nuclear waste, hazardous waste import and disposal in the Arctic are critical matters. Restrictions on the substance classes permitted to be dumped in the deep Arctic waters would help to provide a legal basis for action against parties who are not living up to their obligations. Ships’ ballast water should not be allowed to be changed in the Arctic, since this could introduce alien species to the region. In addition, no open disposal of trash or sewage, including through the use of a macerator, should be allowed. This would send a message that the Arctic nations recognize that the world’s other oceans have been mismanaged and that they are determined not to make the same mistakes in the Arctic.

Prohibiting Nuclear Pollution

The Arctic is home to the world’s two major nuclear powers – the United States and Russia – neither of whom has a strong history of best practices in the region with regards to nuclear disposal. It is essential that the Arctic is made a nuclear “no dump” zone, with strict and readily enforceable penalties for a violating nation, perhaps through an escrow account. As the Soviet submarine and icebreaking fleet ages, this becomes increasingly important – indeed, the Soviets are currently capable of projecting only one submarine at a time at sea. The Soviets might request financial assistance to better dispose of nuclear waste. United States vessels should be subject to the same standards as Russian vessels. An independent non-governmental monitoring organization should be given full access to nuclear ships in order to assure that best practices are followed.

Indigenous Peoples

With approximately four million inhabitants and a dearth of economic activity, the Arctic nations could help the indigenous tribes they have so often exploited by providing further economic opportunities for them. These peoples’ regional memory is unsurpassed and of tangible value to any regime aimed at sustainable development of the region. Funding indigenous education can raise awareness about Arctic issues and help to generate job growth in native economies. Indigenous tribes, particularly in Greenland, could thus position themselves to receive a piece of the growing regional economic pie. An Arctic Treaty can also mandate that some of the jobs created in the region go to the people who have historically lived there.

Education

An Arctic Treaty would also serve a variety of educational purposes. First, the treaty body could maintain a website where all Arctic-related news and policies are centrally disseminated. Through increased transparency and better communication of policies, the Arctic nations could breed cooperation rather than distrust. Increased dialogue among nations, already occurring within the Arctic Council, would promote regional security and likely dissuade nations from taking renegade policy stances. In turn, this would serve to keep the public better informed and more aware of current events and policy stances in the Arctic region.

Fisheries Management

Fisheries management under an Arctic regime would become an international matter, with a comprehensive legal regime that protects all fisheries in the area (there are currently exploitable gaps in the protected areas). This would discourage nations from treading on other nations’ fishing grounds. It would also reduce coordination problems, eliminating situations in which one nation establishes a sustainable quota but its neighbor does not and the fishery as a whole is overfished. Regional rather than national data on total fish catches would also allow experts to better monitor fishery health and to adjust fisheries policy accordingly. High seas fisheries management, as evidenced by overfished North Atlantic fishing grounds, has traditionally been highly ineffectual; in the Arctic, creating an international fisheries management regime would promote dialogue and reduce national tensions while simultaneously facilitating stronger overall fisheries practices.

Protecting Endangered Species

What would be the regime’s role in protecting Arctic waters and the associated ecosystems? First, an Arctic regime should incorporate protection for offshore feeding areas of polar bears and other endangered species. Current legal regimes fail to provide this protection. The Arctic regime can comfortably draw on precedent in the Antarctic by establishing specially protected areas in ecologically sensitive regions. Such legislative protection would be an acknowledgement by the Arctic nations that the entire food chain needs to be subject to management practices.

Promoting Sound Environmental Land Use

Since domestic regimes apply to land areas in the Arctic region, any cooperative Arctic regime must focus on water rather than land. However, the Arctic states could jointly recommend beneficial domestic land-based policies. For instance, they might seek to curtail over-foresting and protect reindeer grazing grounds that are important to native peoples. In addition, restrictions on pesticide use in the region would be an important step towards minimizing the environmental impact of increased Arctic farming.

Uniformity of Ice Charting

To minimize risk of operator error and facilitate ease of use, ice charts should be disseminated under a uniform system, rather than under the several different graphic schemes presently employed.  This would ensure that captains can interpret ice charts across regions.  To minimize switching costs, the charts should be published under both current and integrated systems for a number of years with new captains instructed in the integrated system and old captains still able to check old system ice charts that match their already acquired knowledge. 

Regionally Licensed Captains

An Arctic regime would also require that regionally licensed captains be made available along every sea route and required for cargo vessels transiting the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passages. These captains would be certified pilots like those required in other parts of the world for navigating sensitive and dangerous areas, such as areas near major metropolises. To minimize the risk of operator error, pilots should have to meet different accreditation requirements for the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage Captains should be required to keep up a minimum of service time in the region, similar to current United States Coast Guard or other international captaincy requirements, in order to maintain their regional licenses.

Data-Based Hull and Ice Regimes

If data on vessel build specifications were properly collected, this data would also allow for more complete hull and ice classifications to be created based on real-world data analysis. Hull and ice classification regimes should be made consistent internationally, with vessel clearance a duty of the Arctic shipping command unit. Enforcement of hull and ice regimes would then fall to national coast guards and other military units such as a national navy or air force if appropriate. While these units would be authorized to use force if necessary, the threat of force rather than the use of deadly force will often be enough to turn a rogue captain around without serious confrontation.

Open Exchange of Usage Information

Data collected by the central command unit could be made easily available to individual nations to promote national security. Information about vessel type, location, speed, port of origin and destination of Arctic vessels should be public information made available globally via the internet through this central organization. On an interactive map of the region, governments would then be able to track Arctic ships along their voyages. On this map, vessel indicator icons should include a link to the ship’s ice classification as well as photographs of the vessel and other pertinent design information. Such transparency would ease national security concerns and help to ensure that the Arctic does not become a conflict zone.

This central command agency would also be responsible for maintaining data on Arctic shipping, including time trends. Such data could be used to assess growth rates in Arctic shipping as well as to assess factors contributing to disasters including vessel class, port of origin and navigational route used. Time trend data could provide consistent, non-partisan evidence in international courts of law to establish or refute the status of waterways as international straits.

Central Vessel Monitoring

In keeping with this spirit of increased cooperation, quality information exchange of both scientific and non-scientific information on an increased scale is needed in the Arctic. Each of the following roles would facilitate best management practices in the region. First, global ship tracking and monitoring systems should be integrated. Namely, a central command unit funded by the Arctic nations and endowed with complete oversight capabilities should clear, track and oversee all Arctic shipping. This would allow threats to be monitored constantly, provide transparency about Arctic activities, and permit ships in imminent danger – for instance, a vessel traveling close to navigational hazards – to be properly alerted and diverted. At the same time, a central monitoring system would allow infrastructure costs to be spread amongst the nations.

Overview

There are a variety of roles a cooperative Arctic environmental management regime should play that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and domestic legal regimes fail to fill. First, a cooperative regime can encourage further scientific research and scientific cooperation, both of which are desperately needed. The world community must develop a more informed portrait of the region, its ecosystems and how specific components such as native fish populations might react to exogenous shocks including warming water temperatures. A stronger commitment to research on ice decline, including why it is occurring and its broad consequences, would allow scientists to create better projections of future ice melt and provide politicians the opportunity to shape policy off of these improved assumptions. Further geological surveys would also provide more accurate insight into the amount of recoverable oil, gas and mineral resources in the Arctic.

Creating a Regional Arctic Regime

Whether the world needs an international environmental regime in the Arctic is an area of debate that had been frozen until recently. On May 28, 2008, the five states that border the Arctic – Canada, Russia, the United States, Norway and Denmark – issued the two page Ilulissat Declaration stating that they believe current international law provides an adequate basis for Arctic governance. The five states, which have long jealously guarded their regional sovereignty, indicated that they are willing to accept the “important rights and obligations” given under the Law of the Sea. Acknowledging their stewardship role, the five states nonetheless stated that they do not see a need for a new international legal regime to govern the Arctic.

The Arctic region must be approached as a global problem. Development will be accompanied by increased shipping. With increased shipping will come shipwrecks, which will introduce the threat of oil spills and other environmental hazards, such as alien species living in ballast water, to the Arctic. Search and rescue operations in the remote and hostile climate of the Arctic will be difficult even in the best of circumstances. Development will also threaten fragile and valuable fisheries, especially since there is currently no comprehensive regional fisheries management regime.

Contextual factors matter in the Arctic and natural and human events unfolding outside of the Arctic, particularly climate change, demand progressive thinking and commitment to active cooperation in and protection of the Arctic that only an international regime can create. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea does not provide a level of regulation and coordination that can simultaneously protect the fragile Arctic environment, ensure that shipping traffic is safe and well-monitored and manage development. As Oran Young and Gail Osherenko note in Polar Politics, developing effective international legal regimes requires using intellectual capital. Unless the nations embrace new ways of thinking, they will become prisoner to conventional perspective.  In order to escape the current painfully slow approach to policymaking, the Arctic nations need to move beyond jurisdictional approaches to the Arctic.

The Antarctic can serve as an example: the Antarctic Treaty effectively suspended all national territorial claims for the duration of the treaty but addressed key legal issues by creating a demilitarized zone and an environmental protection regime. The Antarctic Treaty was unique and pace-setting, establishing the first nuclear-free zone and installing international rights of inspection and observation.

The Antarctic Treaty was also the first treaty designed to protect scientific concerns. Politicians stepped aside and let the scientific community, which had freshly completed coordinated research during the 1957-8 International Geophysical Year, assemble a legal regime designed in the best interests of mankind. The scientific community has a similar history of cooperation in the Arctic, having recently completed the 2007-8 International Polar Year, and could therefore play a facilitating and largely apolitical role in assembling an international environmental legal regime.

The Arctic nations have taken the first steps tot facilitate negotiating such a regime. In 1996, they created the intergovernmental Arctic Council, in which the Arctic nations as well as indigenous peoples’ groups are represented. The Arctic Council provides a ready forum for negotiating a cooperative legal regime that serves the interests of the nation-states, indigenous peoples and other parties. A cooperative legal regime would also discourage free-riders without compromising national sovereignty.

Protecting the Arctic is important: the global community only gets one earth, and creating an international Arctic regime is the most effective way to ensure that the Arctic region is well protected both today and in the future. An Arctic Treaty would ensure that regulations are applied more evenly across states and thus promote better protection than domestic regimes in which nations may have incentives to undercut each others’ policies. An international legal regime would also be an explicit acknowledgement that the Arctic is a particularly fragile and important region.

Policy Implications

Chapter V lays out recommendations for an Arctic environmental regime. These recommendations include special protection for indigenous species, increased scientific research and cooperation, specifications for search and rescue capabilities, integrated ship monitoring and ice chart systems and comprehensive regional fisheries management and tourism regulations. This chapter also investigates the vagaries of future icebreaker construction and the role icebreakers can play in the Arctic. Finally, this chapter recommends where to direct the national resources of the eight Arctic nations in the Arctic in the coming years.

Evidence Against a National Approach

The national regime approach discounts the interconnectedness of the Arctic region. The Antarctic governance regime was established in the interests of all mankind; the Arctic regime should be established for the same reasons and therefore should not form under separate national frameworks. The Arctic Ocean ties the eight Arctic nations and their ecosystems together as a circumpolar group. Disequilibrium in the ecosystem of any one nation could cause a ripple effect in neighboring nations’ ecosystems. The Arctic will be developed, and it is in the collective interest of mankind that it be developed sustainably. While a national approach can apply legal regimes to much of the region, it is an unconscionable risk to allow nations to develop their own environmental regimes. Some may lead by example, but others may become free riders in an inextricably interconnected system. In addition, current international law does not provide sufficient environmental protection for areas of the Arctic outside of sovereign nations’ Exclusive Economic Zones, an issue that could be addressed by a cooperative Arctic regime but not by national policies alone.

In almost all cases, Arctic shipping will cross more than one national territorial boundary. National environmental protection regimes do not incorporate the necessary processes of institutional bargaining and negotiation that would produce a regime in the collective best interests of the Arctic nations. For instance, a negotiated regional Arctic regime might establish international legal standards for hull limits. This would eliminate confusion amongst shipbuilders. Such certainty about hull standards would decrease the risk associated with entering Arctic shipping operations while creating the opportunity for best practices to be developed and exchanged internationally. Building stronger and more environmentally friendly vessels for use in Arctic transport would also be a boon to all nations, since it would decrease the risk that they suffer a negative externality in the form of an environmental disaster.

National regimes also fail to ensure that any one nation does not benefit or suffer disproportionately from its own or other nations’ Arctic policies. For instance, a strict environmental regime in one Arctic nation could shift investment to other Arctic nations. Such redistributive effects are a strong disincentive to increased regulation in a framework of national regimes. National regimes would promote short-term profit at the expense of the region’s long-term health.

National regimes in an interconnected Arctic would also do an insufficient job of insuring intergenerational wealth transfer. The Arctic is a resource for future generations: the economic value of its fish stocks, forestry, oil and natural gas industries and shipping lanes extends well beyond the next decade or two. However, if the Arctic nations do not take the appropriate measures to protect these resources in the early stages of the region’s development, many of them will be damaged or unavailable to future generations. As with the Antarctic, an international agreement would affirm that this generation views the Arctic as a collective good for mankind.

In the Arctic, national regimes are already in place for the management of national resources, including oil, gas, minerals and the environment. However, these regimes were by and large constructed in a pre-Arctic world and therefore developed to regulate land-based operations. Arctic policy’s focus is ocean-based. An international agreement that formalizes the mandates of the Arctic Council and its Working Groups would provide better long-term protection than national regimes and in the short term be a quicker solution to implementing sustainable development policies in the Arctic region. The basis for cooperation exists: Arctic framework needs to be expanded on and endowed with real powers in order to effectively and sustainably protect the Arctic.

Evidence For a National Approach

The current Arctic governance regime relies in large part on domestic legal regimes. This allows nations to independently apply domestic law within their Exclusive Economic Zones and to enforce their sovereignty within the region. It does not place a disproportionate monitoring cost on better-equipped nations, such as Russia. The national regime system recognizes that the Arctic is a polarized region of strategic importance to two of the world’s greatest superpowers, Russia and the United States. National regimes also allow countries to best express their individual interests and can force regional business interests to operate under the strictest set of national environmental requirements. For instance, if the hull strength requirements are more lax in Nation A than in Nation B but a shipping route runs through the internal waters of both nations, the shipping company will need to build ships under the stricter set of requirements.

The national approach also allows for the Arctic nations to develop their Arctic territory at different paces. Russia has been by far the most assertive nation in this respect to date, claiming that it wants the Arctic to become its main resource base by 2020. Many other nations, including Canada, Iceland and Denmark, are just getting their Arctic development policies off the ground. National regimes can analyze individual cases more closely. Intricate, complicated and different domestic bureaucracies increase the cost and risk of investing in the Arctic for businesses and therefore may actually on net slow development of the region relative to a streamlined regional regime. In effect, bureaucracy could actually serve to better protect the Arctic regional environment.

National regimes also allow nations to accelerate the process of modifying policies that they believe need to be changed. Currently, the Arctic Council meets only once every two years. Under a new international regime, creating new specially protected areas, implementing heightened environmental standards or performing a variety of other tasks might have to wait until this meeting. The region is changing so rapidly that the ability to take action quickly and unilaterally is important. National regimes provide this versatility more easily than an international regime.

Finally, national regimes could still be coordinated across borders. Nation-states could bargain among themselves to negotiate agreements on important topics. Separate national fisheries policies could be guided by communication between national bodies. The Arctic Council and its Working Groups already provide a forum for increased communication and cooperation amongst nations. A national regime system that is coordinated via increased cooperation accomplishes the dual goals of protecting sovereignty in the region and promoting forward-thinking development.

Evidence Against a Cooperative Regime

While polar experts such as Oran Young have begun to embrace the concept of a cooperative Arctic governance regime within the past decade, there are many real-world challenges to creating such a regime. Competing national interests, legitimate claims of territorial sovereignty, the opportunity for economic gain and an unbalanced distribution of power on an international as well as regional scale all diminish the Arctic nations’ incentives to form a regional regime. Basic geographic, legal and strategic considerations can also help to explain why a cooperative regime would be difficult to negotiate and implement. The Arctic is a strategically critical region that, unlike Antarctica, falls largely under domestic legal regimes as outlined by the United Nations Convention on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The Arctic is also the largest operative arena for nuclear submarines in the world and the site of nearly a quarter of the world’s oil and natural gas reserves, which have the potential to generate substantial revenues for corporations and sovereign governments alike.

There is a risk that a negotiated cooperative regime would be dominated by the interests of the most powerful regional players, namely Russia and the United States. Russia aside, there has been a widespread lack of national fiscal commitment to the Arctic region. Other nations’ disinvestment has left Russia in a particularly strong bargaining position. Coupled with the geographic scope of the region, the existing overall poor physical infrastructure base would make Arctic policy difficult to enforce on the ground without significant Russian vessel support. Though not specifically intended for Arctic use, United States Navy and Coast Guard units could also contribute to policy enforcement efforts and add to the United States’ regional bargaining power. The United States and Russia are in a position to impose their interests on an Arctic treaty rather than use the treaty to provide public goods to other nations.

Past events indicate that such a realist perspective is well founded. The United States, for instance, has long coveted the right of innocent passage through the Northwest Passage. In any bargain that involved new United States commitment, particularly in the form of icebreaking or search and rescue services along the Northwest Passage, the United States would be likely to request a guarantee of innocent passage along the Northwest Passage in return. Meanwhile, Russia has already invested heavily in Arctic infrastructure including icebreakers and deepwater drilling equipment and would be unlikely to consent to any agreement that significantly limited natural resource extraction. Major exporters and importers would benefit if navigational aids and other safety measures, such as search and rescue capability and integrated ship monitoring, were put in place. Coastal states such as Iceland, however, would bear new risks as increasing number of ships sailed through their waters without putting into port and contributing to the local economy.

The Arctic nations do not have a history of military or economic cooperation that indicates they are ready to work together to form a cooperative regional governance regime. They belong to competing military and strategic alliances – four of the Arctic nations are NATO members – and the strongest non-geographic tie binding seven of the eight nations appears to be that they all recently lag Russia when it comes to efficiently implementing Arctic policy.  Russia and the United States led opposing blocs during the Cold War, in which the Arctic became a central military arena. Finland and Sweden are proximate to Russia and understandably wary of increased Russian power as well as uneasy taking a hard-line negotiating stance with Russia. The Nordic countries have committed to increased strategic Nordic defense cooperation but this is largely to protect them from the threat that is Russia. Combined, the United States and Canada operate only seven icebreakers, none of which approaches the size of Russia’s 50 LET Pobedy, which provides Russia outsized regional bargaining power. Indeed, neither the United States nor Canada has launched an icebreaker since 1997, when the United States launched the USCG Healy. Russia is the only Arctic nation with nuclear icebreakers (it currently operates eight such vessels) and as such enjoys a significant operational advantage in addition to bargaining power: Russian icebreakers, unlike conventional icebreakers, can put to sea for months at a time unlimited by range concerns.  In short, the operational capabilities and strategic interests of the eight Arctic nations are poorly aligned in many respects.

Who would lead the push for a regional agreement? One country, Russia, controls the majority of natural resources in the region as well as two important strategic resources: the Northern Sea Route and the strongest icebreaker fleet, by far, in the world. Russia, though, has proven willing to operate unilaterally in the region, monetizing the Northern Sea Route and antagonizing foreign powers by planting a symbolic flag on the ocean floor at the North Pole. Statements from the Kremlin indicate that Russia plans to make the Arctic its main resource base by 2020. Atomflot, the state-sponsored Russian nuclear energy company, has plans to unveil new icebreakers in the near future, including a behemoth in 2017 capable of carving sea lanes through three to three and a half meters of ice.  In addition, Russia has recently resumed Soviet-era overflights near Alaska and exacerbated Norway by operating naval vessels and aircraft near the Svalbard Archipelago. While Russia has participated in regional agreements protecting polar bears and outfitted the icebreaker 50 LET Pobedy with advanced environmental systems, secrecy shrouds its Arctic past and, to some extent, future. Based on this and a variety of other factors, including the spent nuclear fuel in its aging nuclear submarine fleet which it has improperly disposed of in the past, Russia is at once the most powerful Arctic actor and the greatest threat to regional military and environmental security of the eight nations. This is not a position from which Russia is likely to lead.

Canada has demonstrated an inability to effectively respond to its own national challenges in the Arctic and as such does not possess the political resources necessary to mount a campaign for a comprehensive Arctic Treaty. With a population of just thirty-three million citizens - smaller than California – simple economics pose a challenge to defending Canadian sovereignty.  Canada has the second-longest Arctic coastline and claims (disputed) sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. This coastline exposes it to great risk should an environmental disaster occur in the Northwest Passage, where vessels are not currently required to transit accompanied by an icebreaker. However, Canadian Arctic policy commitments, such as the Mulroney government’s mid-1980s promise of a Polar Class 8 icebreaker, have long lacked fiscal backing.

The United States’ attention is clearly focused in other areas than the Arctic. Partisanship in Washington, D.C. as well as budgetary concerns, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the aftermath of a financial meltdown are all indications that the United States government is overextended. Washington has also refused to ratify the Kyoto Convention and participated in only under much pressure and in a limited fashion at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference. Washington politicians’ interests in the Arctic are more likely to relate to economic development in the region and securing clearance for United States shipping through the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Routes than to forging a comprehensive regional agreement dedicated to environmental protection and demilitarization. Indeed, the United States views the Arctic as a strategically important region and continues to maintain submarine patrols in the Arctic Ocean even though the Soviet submarine fleet is in disrepair and presently incapable of projecting a sustained military presence. Confrontations with Canada over United States use of Arctic waters, including the passages of the US Manhattan and US Polar Sea and unannounced submarine voyages, do not point to a national preoccupation with creating a cooperative Arctic management regime.

The other five Arctic nations – Norway, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Denmark – do not have the leverage to independently force Canada, the United States or Russia to enter into regional regime negotiations. While these five nations have recently paid increased attention to the region, their new commitments have largely involved an increase in Arctic military force projection to counteract Russia’s regional assertiveness.

Iceland in particular could not lead a treaty effort, as it has no new Arctic territory to claim, is handcuffed by a recent national bankruptcy, has traditionally maintained neutrality and does not maintain a standing army, navy or air force. Finland and Sweden are subject to significant environmental risks but can do little more than call for other nations to increase coordination and environmental protection measures. For instance, Finland is worried about environmental hazards stemming from dated nearby Russian nuclear power plants but has relatively little bargaining power with which to work. Denmark is interested in the economic potential of the region as a source of oil and natural gas but has no driving incentive to build icebreakers or lead the rest of the nations in an environmental protection agreement. Finally, Norway has committed itself to an increased presence in the Arctic, including organizing the Stoltenberg Report and calling for increased Nordic military cooperation, but has ongoing territorial disputes with Russia and has been questioned for its fisheries management practices in the Barents Sea.

Regime Solutions

This chapter investigates potential solutions to the Arctic governance problem. In particular, the chapter focuses on the benefits and drawbacks of a potential regionally cooperative (multinational) regime as well as the continuation of the current system of separate national regimes, with most coordination occurring through the Arctic Council, which has no power to change actual policy.

International Maritime Organization

The International Maritime Organization is a United Nations agency specifically tasked with improving maritime safety and preventing pollution from maritime vessels. The International Maritime Organization has a Legal Committee designed to cover liability and compensation issues related to maritime disasters. The Legal Committee meets every April and October and is generally responsible for defining the legal regime related to international maritime organizations, for instance completing compulsory pilot agreements in a strait used for international navigation.  Primarily focused on promoting safety at sea and pollution prevention, the International Maritime Organization has also been responsible for the creation of ship design, construction and operation standards as well rules concerning distress communications at sea.

The International Maritime Organization is a relatively small organization with approximately three hundred international staff. Member states are responsible for enforcing compliance with its conventions and recommendations. However, with broad-based participation from member states and a well-respected decision-making process, the International Maritime Organization has considerable influence in the world of international maritime transport. Today, the International Maritime Organization is focused on implementation as well as technical cooperation, including identifying and providing resources to coastal states that lack expertise, training or funding. As the organization principally responsible not only for the safety of life at sea (SOLAS) convention but for the compensation and liability framework related to pollution and other maritime incidents as well as many ship design standards, the International Maritime Organization’s chief challenge in the Arctic will be to convince Arctic nations to bear the cost of enforcing its conventions and recommendations.

International Hydrographic Organization

The International Hydrographic Organization was designed to facilitate the creation and implementation of timely hydrographic data by states the world over. Timely, detailed and accurate hydrographic information would support the protection of the marine environment while encouraging maritime safety and efficiency. Established in 1921 and with roots that reach back to the late 19th century, the International Hydrographic Organization typically seeks to ensure the greatest possible uniformity among maritime charts and documents as well as to facilitate international cooperation of national hydrographic efforts. While the organization meets only once every five years, at which time the national hydrographic directors adopt programs to be pursued during the next five years, it could play a role in helping to integrate ice regime systems in the Arctic as well as to speed the charting of Arctic shipping channels. For instance, it would facilitate safe passage if there were one effective ice classification system for the entire Arctic as this would minimize confusion among pilots. In addition, accurate hydrographic charts of the Arctic will be necessary through major shipping routes as well as in areas where, for instance, hydrocarbons are transported from deep-sea drilling operations by tanker. The organization could also play a leading role in the increased adoption of electronic charts, which are more easily updated to account for changing seafloor conditions and newly discovered hazards. All eight Arctic nation states are International Hydrographic Organization members; in addition, membership is widespread amongst countries with heavily trade-dependent economies.

International Union for the Conservation of Nature

The mission of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature is to help find solutions to environmental and development challenges. Of the eight Arctic nations, only the United States and Russia have International Union for the Conservation of Nature offices.  However, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature has a wide knowledge base on conservation matters: for instance, it maintains a red list of threatened species and publications on the assessment and monitoring of ecosystems. The International Council of Environmental Law is a member of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature. Linda Nowlan, a scholar with the International Union for the Conservation of Nature, published a comprehensive 2001 review that discusses the “Arctic Legal Regime for Environmental Protection.” This paper explores the environmental regime system in place in the Arctic in 2001 as well as the potential for negotiating a sustainability treaty for the Arctic. With the rapid pace of change in the Arctic, works such as Nowlan’s report are necessary to maintain the integrity of available information about Arctic environmental regimes. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature can be one important source of information on best conservation practices as Arctic governments look to manage development in the region in a sustainable fashion.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change entered into force on March 21, 1994. The Convention provides a framework for intergovernmental efforts to tackle climate change and enjoys membership from 192 countries.  All eight Arctic nations are party to the Convention, with all but Finland (which has accepted) having ratified the Convention.  Therefore, the Convention is well-suited to provide guidance on a framework for intergovernmental environmental stewardship efforts in the Arctic.

In the mid-1990s, the Convention became the forum at which the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in an attempt to establish legally binding limits on developed countries’ greenhouse gas emissions. Since 2005, the Convention has met jointly with members of the Protocol and Convention members have been permitted to act as observers on Protocol matters if they are not party to the Protocol.  This is an important precedent for broad international involvement on climate change policy in a cross-organizational forum and provides a good model for non-Arctic states to have a voice in shaping an Arctic environmental regime system. Incorporating meetings of an Arctic environmental stewardship organization into the Convention, where other nations could act as observers, would be a sign of accountability and transparency on the part of the eight Arctic nations.

Indigenous Peoples (Sami; Inuit in North America)

Indigenous groups have been recognized as Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council. At stake for the Arctic indigenous peoples in the coming years are issues such as self-determination and the ability to experience positive benefits from the development of the region while maintaining, to the extent they consider desirable, indigenous practices.

The Saami Council was the first international organization of indigenous Arctic peoples. The Saami Council includes Saami representatives from all four Saami nations: Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia. Saami parliaments, excepting the Russian representatives, are elected by member Saami groups. The Saami representatives specifically seek to preserve and enhance the economic, social and cultural rights of the Saami people. For instance, in Finland the Saami Paadar brothers recently completed a landmark settlement with a forestry company over reindeer herding rights in which the forestry company agreed not to farm ninety percent of the forest on the Paadar’s grazing land suited for forestry.  However, the Saami have also experienced difficulty, for instance recently being denied representation at a meeting of the five Arctic Ocean states despite being Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council. The Saami Council ultimately seeks recognition of the Saami as a nation. The Saami are also represented by the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples in the North.

The other major indigenous groups in the Arctic are of Inuit descent. They are represented principally by the Inuit Circumpolar Council as well as the more distinct and regional Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council and Gwich’in Council International.  These organizations all have aims similar to those of the Saami Council, including maintaining economic, political and cultural rights on an international level. The Inuit Circumpolar Council is specifically focused on sustainable long-term policies in the region and increasing the unity of the Arctic Inuit peoples.

The Arctic Council Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat seeks to create opportunities for the indigenous peoples to speak for themselves. In addition, it provides technical support and information to indigenous peoples looking to make their voice heard. This includes ensuring that the work of the Arctic Council are clearly communicated to the indigenous peoples, for instance through the disseminations of documents detailing the work of the Arctic Council as well as coordinating meetings between indigenous peoples’ organizations.

The Arctic Council

Formed by the Ottawa Declaration of 1996, the Arctic Council serves as a “high level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction...on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”  All eight Arctic nations are Council members. There is also a category for groups representing area indigenous peoples in two categories: (1) a single indigenous people resident in more than one Arctic state, such as the Inuit people or (2) more than one Arctic indigenous people resident in a single Arctic state.

The governance structure of the Arctic Council provides for a two-year rotating chairmanship among member nations. Senior officials of Arctic nations meet at least every six months while Arctic Council Ministerial Meetings are held biannually. In addition, the Arctic Council sponsors working groups and allows observer status to non-Arctic states, non-governmental organizations and global as well as regional inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary organizations.

The Arctic Council is a forum only for decision-shaping, not a decision-making. While it is the only truly circumpolar body and a much-needed forum for discussion on regional issues, the Arctic Council in essence serves as a bouncing board for knowledge, guidelines and best practices within the Arctic. Its role could be strengthened by formally sanctioning observers and encouraging global players such as China to assume observer status. In addition, the Arctic Council could provide observers with a broader role in the operations of the Council.

The Arctic Council has assumed or created six critical working groups with individual missions related specifically to the Arctic. The Arctic Contaminants Action Program seeks to reduce the emission of pollutants in order to reduce identified pollutant risks. The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program provides scientific advice and information to the Arctic governments related to the status of and threats to the Arctic region. The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Arctic working group helps to promote sustainability in the region, in particular the conservation of Arctic biodiversity. The Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response working group is designed to deal with the prevention of, planning for and best response to environmental disasters in the region. Its work has dealt primarily with hydrocarbon extraction and radiological best practices, in addition to more recent duties including natural disasters. However, it is important to note that the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response working group is not a response agency. The fifth working group, Protection of the Marine Arctic Environment, looks to address policy and non-emergency pollution prevention and control measures to better protect the Arctic marine environment. Finally, the Sustainable Development Working Group seeks to further environmentally sustainable Arctic development, working with local communities on projects related to, for instance, youth education, tourism and health.

The creation and success of these six working groups is evidence that despite the limited history of international cooperation in the Arctic, the eight Arctic nations recognize that it is in their own as well as the global community's mutual interest to preserve and protect this fragile region through sustainable, educated and manageable development. However, the rush for resources will undoubtedly introduce tensions into this relationship that may be beyond the scope of the Arctic Council and its working groups' capacities.

International Court of Justice

In 1949, the International Court of Justice made a historic ruling in the Corfu Channel case involving the legal definition of an international strait. The Court ruled and the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone further codified that geographically, an international strait is any strait that connects two portions of the high seas. However, the court also ruled that an international strait must fulfill a functional definition of being a useful, not just potentially useful, route for international maritime traffic. This geographic and functional definition was later reiterated by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The definition is in keeping with the freedom of the high seas doctrine and substantially reduces the legal capacity of any coastal state to hinder the freedom of movement of seagoing vessels between the oceans of the world.

On the subject of international straits, there is debate in the Arctic about whether or not the Northwest Passage north of Canada is an international strait. The United States holds that the Northwest Passage is indeed an international strait and has repeatedly asserted this view. Indeed, the repeated northern passages of United States submarines without Canadian permission as well as the Manhattan and Polar Sea incidents are all practical demonstrations of the United States' unwillingness to concede that the straits of the Northwest Passage constitute part of international waters.

If a significant number of vessels make the voyage through the Northwest Passage or another northern passage, such as the Northern Sea Route, without first consulting the neighboring state then that state risks losing control of the passage. A nation's legal jurisdiction is significantly limited within an international strait, as the International Maritime Organization's guidelines rather than domestic regimes apply to the governance of environmental and shipping practices within international straits. This could impose significant environmental costs near environmental state.

A state bordering an international strait is allowed to maintain “sovereignty or jurisdiction over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil”—Canada would not lose the right to explore and exploit the mineral resources of the Northwest Passage if it were classified as an international strait. However, Canada does risk losing much of the control it currently claims but often does not exercise over traffic through the Northwest Passage. Indeed, a ruling that the Northwest Passage constitutes an international strait would grant the right of transit passage beyond innocent passage to vessels and aircraft using the Northwest Passage. One matter of concern this presents is that under Article 42 of UNCLOS, should a vessel or aircraft engaged in transit passage act in a manner contrary to accepted international laws and regulations, the flag state of a ship or state of registry of an aircraft bears international responsibility for resulting loss or damage to states bordering straits.  This is important because more than half of the world's operating ships are registered under a flag of convenience in order to reduce operating costs or avoid government regulations.  States frequently used as a flag of convenience may be unwilling or unable to pay damages resulting from the operations of vessels flying a flag of convenience. As such, states bordering Arctic international straits might bear a disproportionate share of the risk associated with increased use of Arctic straits. These risk costs would be incurred beyond the additional costs associated with the optional but almost certainly necessary installation and maintenance of navigational markers denoting sea lanes through an international passage by bordering states as provided for under Article 41 of UNCLOS.

Finally, if any Arctic strait is accorded status as an international strait it would open the region to transit passage of naval vessels. During transit passage, ships are required by UNCLOS to “refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of States bordering the strait” as well as to refrain from engaging in marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys without prior authorization from bordering states.  In an international strait, however, submarines are permitted to voyage in their normal subsurface mode of operation whereas in a territorial sea, subsurface vessels are required to operate on the surface and to show their flag.  Naval traffic would pose a national security threat to Arctic states bordering waterways judged to be international straits.

United Nations Commision on the Limits of the Continental Shelf

The United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf is designed to facilitate the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In accordance with UNCLOS, coastal states with a continental shelf extending more than two hundred nautical miles make submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf delineating their claims under Article 76 of UNCLOS and the Statement of Understanding adopted on August 29, 1980 by the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The commission provides scientific and technical advice to coastal states where needed and finally makes recommendations to coastal states on matters related to the establishment of the limit of their continental shelf. According to the Purpose of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, “its recommendations and actions shall not prejudice matters relating to the delimitation of boundaries between States with opposite or adjacent coasts."  This means that the Commission traditionally recommends bilateral or multilateral negotiations in the event of an overlapping boundary claim. For example, this was the recommendation of the Commission in areas of the Barents sea over which both Norway and Russia have made claims.

The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf holds private sessions twice annually, once in the spring and once in the fall, at the United Nations headquarters in New York. Twenty-one experts in geology, geophysics or hydrology are elected by their states to sit on the Commission and the representation of states is designed to ensure equitable geographic representation with not less than three members elected from each geographical region. Election is by two-thirds majority with a quorum of two-thirds of the states party to the convention necessary in order to hold an election, which is convened at United Nations Headquarters by the Secretary-General. Commission members serve a term of five years and are eligible for reelection.

States have until ten years from the date when the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea enters into force within their state to make submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. The Commission considers each submission separately in seven-member sub-commissions. No expert who has provided scientific or technical advice to the state about the submission or any national of the submitting state is permitted to be part of the subcommission considering a submission and states are required to list those Commission members who have provided the state advice in making its submission. After reviewing the submission, the sub-commission makes recommendations to the entire Commission. If these recommendations are approved by at least a two-thirds majority of the entire Commission, the recommendations of the Commission will be submitted in writing to both the submitting state and to the United Nations Secretary-General.

The work of the Commission is particularly important in the Arctic, where major shipping routes cross national boundaries and the extended continental shelf represents a wealth of mineral and hydrocarbon resources. In large part, the Commission's work is important because of the different authorities legally accorded to states within and beyond their two hundred nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Within the EEZ, coastal states may explore and exploit, conserve and manage both living and non-living natural resources. Furthermore, they can utilize the region for other economic purposes, such as the generation of power from the wind and currents.  Within this zone, they likewise may carry our marine scientific research and preserve and protect the marine environment. However, outside of the two hundred nautical mile EEZ states do not possess these sovereign rights. With billions of barrels of natural gas and oil alone submerged on the Arctic seabed, the ruling of the Commission are therefore of significant economic and political importance.

Iceland: Promoting Environmental Security through Security Cooperation

In 2010, Iceland finds itself dealing with the aftereffects of a national bankruptcy. As the third Arctic nation that does not have any more territory to gain under the guidelines of the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf—Finland and Sweden being the others—it is in the best interests of Iceland to act cooperatively in the international arena, especially since Iceland maintains no navy, army or air force and has a Coast Guard limited to only three offshore vessels, one coastal use hydrographic vessel and four aircraft. Indeed, Iceland's newest Coast Guard vessel, the ICGV Týr, was launched in 1975.

Iceland is currently working with the four other Nordic states on a cooperative defense agreement. When the United States withdrew troops from the Keflavik air base in 2006 Iceland lost much of its airspace surveillance capability.  However, the Nordic countries as well as Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland have all indicated that they are interested in taking part in air patrols of Iceland. Maintaining air patrols mainly targeted at providing soft security would provide Icelandic defense authorities better knowledge of what is happening around their country while strengthening Icelandic jurisdiction in the region.

Iceland represents a crucial link along the major sea route running from Murmansk, Russia to the United States. As such, it will be necessary to keep Icelandic maritime monitoring systems such as radar arrays up to date and well-staffed to ensure continual monitoring of vessels moving along this sea route. Effective and timely dissemination of Icelandic vessel monitoring information in an integrated fashion with the Nordic nations as well as Russia and the United States will allow for more complete monitoring of tanker and other maritime traffic through the region. The Nordic nations address vessel monitoring as a priority in the Stoltenberg Report.  With regard to search and rescue operations, the North Atlantic Coast Guard Forum, consisting of Canada, the United States, Denmark, Iceland and Norway, will need to be integrated with this information system. To dilute the costs of northern search and rescue operations, it is in the best interest of Iceland to participate in the development of a Nordic Coast Guard.

Iceland also faces a significant and, to a large extent, unique challenge among the Arctic nations: it will disproportionately bear the risk associated with increased energy shipments through its waters, in particular from Russia and Norway to the United States. This provides further incentive to Iceland for security cooperation with, in particular, the Nordic states. Indeed, an oil spill or similar catastrophe in or near Icelandic waters could cripple the country's economy.

Iceland does not have indigenous people whose culture it must serve and protect. However, it does have an economy that has traditionally been maritime-focused and as such it is important to the citizens of Iceland that the waters in and around their country stay clean and that fish supplies are monitored and maintained in a sustainable fashion. While Icelandic fishermen have been criticized by their neighbors – including the British and Scottish – for overfishing, Iceland's individual transferable quota system has recently worked reasonably well to manage the Icelandic fisheries. Individual transferable quotas allot a quota of each fish species that a specific boat can catch based on that boat's previous three catches of that fish species.  These quotas are traded amongst boats and there are no limits on the number of days a boat can fish, only on the total tonnage allotted by the quota system. Increased fisheries monitoring coordination with neighboring states is crucial to the Icelandic economy and could help to ensure that its fish stocks are allowed to stabilize at a sustainable level.

Iceland has no significant need for icebreakers of its own. Sea ice in the waters near Iceland originates from the Denmark Strait located off the northwestern coast of Iceland. While ice in the region is quite common, it lies primarily on fishing rather than commercial shipping grounds and is generally considered a part of life for Icelanders.  The winter sea ice off of northwest Iceland would not debilitate maritime transport because there is a sea route immediately to the south of Iceland as well that is largely ice-free year round. Iceland currently maintains weekly charts of ice conditions which are readily available online; however, integration of the various Arctic ice regimes could provide greater continuity amongst systems and further minimize user error interpreting ice charts.

While Iceland has begun to auction some oil and gas leases, government officials admit that they have little data coverage on the amount of oil and gas that may be contained within Icelandic offshore territory.  Pricing for these leases, which are typically deep water and highly risky drilling sites, is therefore more speculative than for leases about which more data on the field's potential yield is known. Iceland prides itself as being a sort of environmental haven despite a history of overfishing that indicates Icelanders do not always protect their resources well. Any broad development of the Icelandic Exclusive Economic Zone for oil or natural gas extraction would be accompanied by political backlash. Therefore, Iceland should focus on regional security and search and rescue cooperation, limited strategic exploitation of natural resources and the development of monitoring infrastructure to better oversee and protect its environment.

Finland and Sweden: Calls for Nordic Cooperation

Finland and Sweden are the only two Arctic nations that do not directly border the Arctic Ocean, with Finland being the most westerly—and thus proximate to Russia—of the two. Finland and Sweden’s interest lie first in ensuring national security as the Arctic becomes more heavily trafficked. Russia operates nuclear power plants close to their borders and poses a significant environmental hazard to both nations. Finland and Sweden both recognize the national threats that Arctic development poses and, as stated in the Stoltenberg Report, are willing to work in a cooperative fashion to design solutions relating to good governance and management of Arctic resources.

From a national security standpoint, the Stoltenberg Report calls on Finland and Sweden to aid in air overflights of Iceland, which has been largely without air surveillance since the 2006 US withdrawal from the Keflavik base.  The Nordic states have also discussed coordination in other areas such as medical assistance, education and exercise ranges. While Finland and Sweden should encourage cooperation in the Arctic, they should also selectively manage their commitments in the Arctic and to tailor them to national purposes. Strategic choices such as whether to invest in military capabilities or scientific research are likely to raise tensions within the Nordic group and will undoubtedly involve compromises on all sides.

Denmark/Greenland: Hydrocarbon Claims and Territory Disputes

Via Greenland, Denmark has a large geographic claim to the Arctic region. Like Russia, Denmark is claiming the North Pole. It claims that the western portion of the Lomonosov Ridge extends from Greenland to the pole and that therefore the Danes have the right to sovereignty over the pole itself. Denmark is also pushing some territorial claims in the islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, saying that they are in fact an extension of Greenland's continental shelf.

As Denmark’s interest in the High North has increased, the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS) has experienced a recent multimillion-dollar funding increase.  This is clear evidence that Denmark believes there is natural gas and oil potential in the region. Indeed, Greenland's Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum recently put the seabed of parts of the Greenland side of the Davis Strait to bid. Oil and natural gas are potential revenue-producers for both Denmark and Greenland officials as extraction techniques improve and more ice melts.

Greenland is in a relatively unique strategic position in the Arctic. Greenland is not physically connected to any major economy and as such could serve only as a launching point for military operations. It also has a population, according to the 2008 World Development Indicators, of only 56,739. In short, Greenland is isolated enough from the rest of the world that while not militarily powerful it faces a smaller national security threat than, say, Norway, Canada or Russia, whose Arctic borders are all gateways to major economies. With its limited resources, Greenland's ability—and need—to develop any sort of significant oceangoing Arctic operations are extremely limited. However, bilateral or multilateral agreements that provide Greenland with icebreaking capabilities could help to enforce environmental regulations and provide search and rescue within Greenland’s territory.

Oil and gas operations off of the shore of Greenland will likely use other nations' ports for day-to-day operations such as refining crude oil given the limited demand for these resources in Greenland and the country's distance from major economies. There is little reason that the Arctic sledge patrols in place for decades cannot continue to serve national security purposes. In addition, Greenland's harsh climate, including recent increased inland precipitation, makes any human activity extremely difficulty in much of the country, particularly to the north—a fact the early Viking settlers learned the hard way.

In light of Greenland’s resource endowment, Greenland and Denmark should focus on environmental and economic concerns. Clearly, developing the oil fields within the limits of Greenland's Exclusive Economic Zone has the potential to generate government revenues and job opportunities. Promoting indigenous peoples as a good source of labor for these operations can ensure that the domestic job market is positively impact by offshore drilling. Greenland and Denmark should participate in environmental monitoring and protection programs: the local environment is of vital importance to local ways of living and must be protected as such. Fish, walrus, whale and seal stocks need to be well-monitored, perhaps jointly with other proximate nations such as the United States, Iceland and Canada. Denmark's government and the local people will need to reach a medium between seeking to exploit the region and continuing to provide for, protect and incorporate Greenlanders into the resource economy.

Norway: Promoting Science, Cooperation and an Increased Nordic Presence

Located at the Western end of the Northern Sea Route, Norway is effectively Russia's Arctic neighbor. Cognizant that it cannot challenge Russia in the Arctic, the Norwegian government seeks to maintain friendly relations with the Kremlin. Indeed, to this end the Norwegian government’s High North Strategy outlines two programs to facilitate cooperative Norwegian-Russian relations: first, an exchange program for Russian students and second, a proposal for an economic and industrial cooperation zone that covers Norwegian and Russian Arctic territories. In addition, Norway seeks to exercise its authority in a credible and predictable manner and considers sustainable Arctic development an imperative of strategic importance for Norway.

Norway currently has two ice-class vessels, both used for research. While the KV Svalbard is relatively new (2001) and is the largest vessel in the Norwegian armed forces, the government stated in 2007 that it would assess the need for a new, larger ice-class vessel. In 2008, Norway made a smaller contribution towards its presence in the Arctic by signing a contract with Rolls-Royce for a 328-foot Polar Class 10 research vessel deliverable in 2012 and capable of navigating in ice up to one foot thick.  In the future, building a larger vessel would further strengthen the international knowledge base in the High Arctic while simultaneously increasing Norway's Arctic presence. Such a vessel would also add to Norway's already significant commitment to High Arctic education and knowledge-building: in 1993, the most northerly higher education institution, the University Centre in Svalbard, was established in Norway.

The Barents Sea is the region of the highest priority for Norway in the Arctic. In particular, despite relatively friendly relations there remains a section known as the Loop Hole of 67,000 square miles disputed between Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea (See Figure 5, Number 4).  With significant estimated petroleum reserves, the Barents Sea and the Loop Hole are important strategic resources for the Norwegian economy. However, a 2006 submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf did not result in Norwegian sovereignty over the Loop Hole. Instead, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf recommended that only a bilateral maritime boundary agreement between Russia and Norway can solve the dispute.

In 2009, Norway became the first state to move its military headquarters to the High North, in Reitan.  This move is in line with the country's increasing focus on the Arctic. There are also revived talks of a regional defense forum, which could facilitate regional resource sharing as Sweden nor Finland are NATO members. However, it is important to note that increased cooperation would be unlikely to take the form of a formal regional defense agreement, instead focusing on increased regional cooperation for security and operational purposes. In the Stoltenberg Report, which outlines the proposed forum, Thorvald Stoltenberg envisions a “Nordic maritime response force with search and rescue expertise and icebreaker capacity.”  The Stoltenberg Report was generally well-received at its 2009 presentation and the Nordic ministers clearly see benefits in regional cooperation.

Finally, Norway is concerned about its indigenous peoples and environmental impacts of increased human presence in the Arctic. The government intends to conduct research on the effects of more intensive use of the High North, particularly in vulnerable areas, and to increase awareness about wilderness-like areas such as northern continental Norway and Svalbard. It also intends to outline a clear environmental operational framework for public- and private-sector interests in the Arctic. In addition, it has outlined a management and monitoring system for the Barents Sea and the sea in the Lofoten area.  The Norwegian Polar Institute and the Institute of Marine Research will also continue to conduct research on the environment, meteorology and climate change in addition to performing a variety of other tasks, including monitoring regional fisheries. With regards to native Sami culture, the government plans to promote increased trade opportunities for native people, safeguard native food sources, promote native radio stations and invite northern people to play a key role in the development of the region.

Russian Policy in the Polar North: In Pursuit of Vital Interests

A September 2008 document addressing Russian Arctic policy until 2020 makes it clear that Russia, unlike the United States and Canada, has no qualms devoting economic as well as political resources to the development of the Arctic.  Russia views the Arctic as a significant vessel for mineral and oil revenue. Russia has invested in an icebreaker fleet with which it has attempted to monetize transport through the Northern Sea Route, requiring all vessels to be accompanied by a Russian icebreaker for a fee.  The Russian government also has a significant personal stake in the Arctic: the Kremlin owns the largest Russian shipping company and through the 2006 expropriation of Yukos has created the largest oil company in the country. Much of Russian shipbuilding has been nationalized under the United Shipbuilding Corporation. The United Shipbuilding Corporation has helped to build Russia's icebreaker fleet, the largest and most technologically advanced in the world with the world's only seven nuclear-powered icebreakers, as well as new Russian ice-reinforced tankers designed for Arctic transport. In the wake of the worldwide financial crisis, Russia's dominant strategy and position in the Arctic could help it gain significant financial and political leverage in the coming years while also providing the foundation for a new wave of economic growth in the country.

Russia has simultaneously projected an increased presence in the Arctic and expressed an interest in acting cooperatively within the region. Putin has resumed Cold War-era Arctic bomber overflights, particularly near Alaska, and Russia's nuclear icebreakers are designed to be outfitted with gun turrets if needed. While the Russians claim that their increased force projection in the region is aimed primarily at terrorism, smuggling, illegal immigration and protection of the marine environment, the increased Russian Arctic presence raises significant concerns for any nation that fears a resurgent and unbalanced Russia. Indeed, Russian officials have publicly stated that the battle over Arctic resources could well become the tipping point for world military power in the coming decades.

The main challenges for Russia in the Arctic principally involve the maintenance and development of its Arctic infrastructure, effective control of the Northern Sea Route and the approval of its submissions for an extension of its continental shelf to the North Pole. Russia's icebreaker fleet is aging: after the launch of the NS Yamal in 1993, Russia did not launch another nuclear icebreaker until the 2007 launch of NS 50 LET Pobedy (50 Years of Victory). Retrofits will extend the thirty-year lifetime of some of Russia's Arctic nuclear fleet, but with a lead time of ten years on icebreaker builds the Russian icebreaker fleet will inevitably shrink before any expansion takes place again. Still, Russia is the only country in possession of a nuclear-powered icebreaker and has most powerful icebreaker in the world, the 524-foot 50 LET Pobedy which is capable of breaking through ice up to 2.8 meters thick.

To update Russia’s icebreaking fleet, Vladimir Putin is working directly with Sergey Kiriyenko of Rosatom, the Russian nuclear company responsible for the country's nuclear icebreakers. Russia plans to develop three new nuclear class icebreakers by 2020 in addition to one lead icebreaker, seven diesel-electric and four port-supporting icebreakers.  This will add to Russia's total icebreaker fleet of forty vessels and ensure the fleet's operational capacity beyond 2020.  State as well as private Russian interests have also invested in new Arctic-class tankers to operate on the Northern Sea Route.  Russia also needs to invest in the maintenance of Arctic ports neglected during the 1990s and the development of new ports that allow Russia to more effectively enforce environmental and shipping regulations along the Northern Sea Route. Building new icebreakers and ice-reinforced tankers will preserve and reinforce Russia's capacity to operate in the Arctic. Within the next few years, Russia also hopes that the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf will approve Russian claims to the eastern portion of the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater mountain chain extending from northern Russia to Greenland, as an extension of the Siberian continental shelf. Access to this additional 465,000 square miles of Arctic territory—approximately equivalent to the size of California—including the geographic North Pole would provide Russia, already the world's largest natural gas provider, with an even larger natural resource base to tap.  Given that most Arctic natural gas lies in Russian territory and that Donald Gautier of the US Geological Survey estimates that most Arctic natural gas and oil reserves are located at depths of less than five hundred meters of water, making them recoverable with current technology, the payoff for Russia could be huge – in the trillions of dollars.

The United States: Security, Shipping and Commercial Exploitation

As Canada's North American Arctic neighbor and the largest global importer, the United States has a lot at risk in the Arctic debate. However, United States policymakers continue to send the message that the country is unready to convey a significant and coherent message about its role in the Arctic. Despite estimates from the US Geological Survey that 22% of the world's technically recoverable resources are located in the Arctic, the region was not even mentioned by President Obama in the 2010 State of the Union address. The United States' oceangoing capabilities in the region remain minimal in 2010 and will stay so for the foreseeable future, with only two operable icebreakers and one of those two constantly committed to resupplying the Antarctic McMurdo station.

The interests of the United States in the Arctic are threefold. First, national security is a principal concern. The Arctic is the shortest route between the world's strongest economies. Therefore, an open polar sea presents concerns about an increased military presence in the region. Indeed, since the Cold War the Arctic has played host to the most extensive nuclear submarine operations in the world. With a warming Arctic, some nations will step up their military presence—surface, subsurface and airborne—in the region. In addition to the waterborne and airborne threat this poses to the United States, the long and largely unprotected Canadian and Alaskan Arctic borders continue to present a security threat for landing troops. The Canadians have long adopted a policy of not building roads in the Far North as a preventive measure that would significantly hamper the movement of any unwelcome visitors. However, this is not a viable long-term policy given the potential for resource development in the region and that infrastructure that will accompany development. The United States needs to cooperate with Canada and address the threat of an exposed North American Arctic border and ensure that the Canadian and Alaskan borders do not become points of military contention and a threat to the United States' national security.

As the world's leading importer and a significant exporter, the United States also has a significant interest in the potential of the Arctic Ocean for reducing oceangoing transit times and costs. American businesses stand to gain from shorter lead times and reduced expenses if the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route open to cargo vessels. Indeed, because over ninety percent of world trade is conducted by ship the potential impact of these routes is difficult to understate. However, the United States must also ensure that reasonable safety standards are enforced and that the proper environmental protection measures are in place. An oil spill in the Northwest Passage would be difficult to contain and could turn public opinion against use of the Arctic for commercial shipping or natural resource extraction. The United States should also ensure that search and rescue bases across the northern longitudes are appropriately equipped to assist in an Arctic search and rescue mission that may take place far offshore. Doing so would be a signal to industry that the United States expects the northern passages to become and remain commercially viable and that it is committed to protecting those who make use of these passages. If appropriately coordinated multinational search and rescue operations are not put in place, Arctic shipping would be more risky than necessary and shipping would divert from the Arctic as a means of risk aversion. This would in turn hamper the competitiveness of the trade-dependent American economy.

Finally, the United States should be interested in the Arctic because the region can provide much-needed short-term energy security. Both onshore and offshore drilling and mining can help to bolster US oil and mineral reserves while providing fiscal relief in the form of leases to the US federal government, which in recent years has run record budget deficits. In addition, increased drilling within the United States' 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone would create real job growth at a time when the United States economy is in desperate need of a sustainable recovery. In Alaska, oil revenue is expected to account for eighty-seven percent of state revenues over the next decade.  Trickle-down money from the oil industry drives nearly every sector of the Alaskan economy. With developed onshore sites in Alaska drying up, responsible expansion of oil and mineral recovery on US territory will be necessary to maintain stability in the Alaskan economy. It is likewise in the interest of the United States to facilitate the expansion of US oil, gas and mineral companies' Arctic operations on non-US territory.