Regime theory assumes that international regimes are capable of affecting the behavior of international actors such as states and corporations. International regimes are accompanied by compliance issues: actors must be convinced that they are not disproportionately bearing the costs of or suffering from a regime. An effective regime, though, establishes the expectations around which an actor shapes decision making procedures. The Antarctic Treaty has effectively provided a decision- and expectation-shaping regime in the Arctic for close to fifty years. Indeed, as Peter J. Beck describes the Antarctic Treaty: “Most commentators interpret the treaty as bringing stability, or rather preserving the stable state of affairs cultivated during the International Geo-physical Year (IGY) of 1957-8, to a region which had proved not only a long-standing source of international rivalry…but also an escalating cause of inter-governmental, even super-power, tension during the decade or so preceding 1959.” An Arctic Treaty could similarly distill tension in and help to preserve the Arctic; the world does not need a new strategic area to be struggled for on the international scene.
In Global Environmental Politics, Chasek et al. describe a regime as a system of norms and rules specified by a multilateral agreement among the relevant states to regulate national actions on a specific issue or set of interrelated issues. To provide incentive to engage in negotiations, a regime must have positive total expected value and positive expected value to each state. Public opinion is a powerful actor in this process, providing an incentive for states to reject the status quo and to participate in a regime created through multilateral negotiations. In the Arctic, Arctic Council mandates may represent the sort of soft law, or nonbinding agreement, that Chasek et al. consider a regime because the mandates can influence state behavior. However, these soft mandates do not represent a strict and binding legal regime and do not constitute an equitable, effective and sustainable regional resource management regime.
Chasek et al. outline four main theoretical approaches to the formation of regimes. First, they discuss the structural regime, which falls into two subcategories. In the first type of structural regime, military and economic powers coerce other states to participate in the regime. In the second type of structural regime, military and economic power is used benevolently to create public goods.
Second, there are game theory regimes. In this regime, the outcome is either zero-sum or non-zero sum. Game theory regimes are assumed to be negotiated by rationale actors who cannot act outside the sphere of other actors’ influence. Unfortunately, in either small or large environmental regimes formed as game theory regimes veto power will remain. This is because any one actor who refuses to adhere to the regime can effectively destroy the collective efforts of the other actors.
The third regime type is an institutional bargaining model. Under institutional bargaining, states are ultimately concerned with economic growth and national security. Therefore, they create institutions to protect resources for future generations. These institutions in turn guide behavioral expectations and norms within the scope of the environmental regime.
Fourth, Chasek et al. identify an epistemic communities model of regime formation in which transnational boundaries formed among a scientific and technological elite influence regime formation. Such a regime, like that formed in Antarctica, requires a high degree of agreement on issues among the scientific community. Even then, private or state interests may hold this community hostage and thus minimize its influence.
Which one of these four theories explains how an Arctic regime might form? There are elements of three of the four theories of regime formation in place. First, the Arctic is a non-zero sum arena in which all states could unequivocally benefit from a strong environmental protection regime. Other states, such as China, might have veto power but effective regime enforcement and activity monitoring can minimize this risk of external veto power. As Chasek et al. state, the structural theory does not apply to environmental regimes. Certainly, this is the case in the Arctic. While Russia and the United States are clearly the dominant military and economic forces in the region, neither has demonstrated a willingness to act for public good and neither appears to derive a large enough individual benefit to coerce other states to participate in an environmental regime.
The epistemic communities model provides the best launching point for an Arctic environmental regime. Indeed, there is a high degree of consensus among scientists that ice melt is occurring and that the region needs to be further protected in order to maintain it for future generations. Scientists’ findings could influence the court of public opinion and push states to consider a cooperative regional resource management regime. This political momentum could carry the regime through an institutional bargaining procedure, a process the Arctic states have already embraced with the formation of the Arctic Council and the Arctic Council working groups responsible for creating non-binding recommendations. In sum, the negotiation of an Arctic environmental regime might at different times draw from different models of regime formation. At points, a regime will be pushed by the scientific community. At other times, the collective interests of the states in participating in a positive-sum game that can also garner political favor in the court of public opinion might keep negotiations going. Finally, traditional institutional bargaining aimed at creating a set of norms and regulations governed by institutions that can effectively protect the region for generations to come will certainly be one characteristic of any regime negotiations.
03 October 2010
Negotiating a Regime: Paths Forward
In 1982, nations concluded negotiations on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (henceforth UNCLOS). UNCLOS provides essential guidelines for maritime law and operations and supersedes the earlier doctrine of freedom of the seas and continental shelf claims. In particular, it provides specific environmental protections, preserves the freedom of navigation, establishes clear guidelines for businesses that depend on the sea and furnishes a respected dispute resolution mechanism. Today, 155 nations have ratified UNCLOS, with the United States a notable exception, though it supports and follows the treaty in principle. UNCLOS can help to cover some basic issues raised in the Arctic and provide a framework under which to delineate sovereign geographic claims based on documented geologic evidence. However, the Arctic also raises issues not covered by UNCLOS, including how to motivate the creation of a common pooled resource such as global ship monitoring systems on an international scale.
This paper addresses the question of how to create an effective, equitable and sustainable resource management regime in the Arctic. Can UNCLOS be adapted to solve the unique problems of the region? Can domestic regimes fill the hole? Or is a cooperative legal framework necessary? The issues raised by increased human activity in the Arctic are significant. Canada, for instance, has legal obligations to the Inuit people. Fishing on the Bering Sea is already a billion dollar industry; with increased ice melt, fishing boats will push further north. UNCLOS fails to address the significant problem of ballast water discharge, which is the number one source of marine invasive species in the U.S. and might significantly damage ecosystems proximate to Arctic ports in the future. Without significant emergency preparedness and response capabilities mandated, an Arctic oil spill could spell devastation for the region's unique species. Security concerns, highlighted when a Russian freight plane landed in the Canadian port town of Churchill, loaded a helicopter and landed hours later in a region of Russia known for organized crime, are serious. These, of course, are only a sampling of the problems that increased Arctic activity presents.
In his seminal work “The Logic of Collective Action”, Mancur Olson contends that large and diverse groups typically do not attain their common goals because major actors bear much of the cost burden of collective benefits in group settings and therefore have less incentive to share the benefits. Unlike the Antarctic, the Arctic falls largely under the domestic regimes of sovereign nations and is not a commons area. However, Olson’s concept of a tragedy of the commons still applies in a variety of ways in the Arctic. Indeed, there is significant incentive for smaller nations to free ride on issues ranging from safety and security to environmental protection without the provision of selective incentives such as decision-making. Larger nations such as Russia, meanwhile, have often proven only grudging participants in the Arctic community because it is not in their best interest to bear the cost of services, such as search and rescue, that other nations will later consume. While progress focused on the sustainable development of the region has been slow, however, there is reason to believe that the Arctic nations can continue to move forward in this respect.
Indeed, in 1996 the Arctic nations came together to form the intergovernmental Arctic Council with the Ottawa Declaration. The Arctic Council's mission is to “provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.” This paper investigates whether the mandates of the Arctic Council and its working groups, composed of the eight Arctic nations, namely Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States, should be institutionalized and whether the Arctic needs a global environmental protection regime to ensure sustainable and responsible development. Given the current state of affairs, is such a solution even possible?
This paper addresses the question of how to create an effective, equitable and sustainable resource management regime in the Arctic. Can UNCLOS be adapted to solve the unique problems of the region? Can domestic regimes fill the hole? Or is a cooperative legal framework necessary? The issues raised by increased human activity in the Arctic are significant. Canada, for instance, has legal obligations to the Inuit people. Fishing on the Bering Sea is already a billion dollar industry; with increased ice melt, fishing boats will push further north. UNCLOS fails to address the significant problem of ballast water discharge, which is the number one source of marine invasive species in the U.S. and might significantly damage ecosystems proximate to Arctic ports in the future. Without significant emergency preparedness and response capabilities mandated, an Arctic oil spill could spell devastation for the region's unique species. Security concerns, highlighted when a Russian freight plane landed in the Canadian port town of Churchill, loaded a helicopter and landed hours later in a region of Russia known for organized crime, are serious. These, of course, are only a sampling of the problems that increased Arctic activity presents.
In his seminal work “The Logic of Collective Action”, Mancur Olson contends that large and diverse groups typically do not attain their common goals because major actors bear much of the cost burden of collective benefits in group settings and therefore have less incentive to share the benefits. Unlike the Antarctic, the Arctic falls largely under the domestic regimes of sovereign nations and is not a commons area. However, Olson’s concept of a tragedy of the commons still applies in a variety of ways in the Arctic. Indeed, there is significant incentive for smaller nations to free ride on issues ranging from safety and security to environmental protection without the provision of selective incentives such as decision-making. Larger nations such as Russia, meanwhile, have often proven only grudging participants in the Arctic community because it is not in their best interest to bear the cost of services, such as search and rescue, that other nations will later consume. While progress focused on the sustainable development of the region has been slow, however, there is reason to believe that the Arctic nations can continue to move forward in this respect.
Indeed, in 1996 the Arctic nations came together to form the intergovernmental Arctic Council with the Ottawa Declaration. The Arctic Council's mission is to “provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.” This paper investigates whether the mandates of the Arctic Council and its working groups, composed of the eight Arctic nations, namely Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States, should be institutionalized and whether the Arctic needs a global environmental protection regime to ensure sustainable and responsible development. Given the current state of affairs, is such a solution even possible?
Shipping Routes
The Arctic is also an attractive transport route. The allure of Arctic shipping is undeniable: the Arctic route is 6500 nautical miles, or 40%, shorter than the trip through the Suez or Panama Canals from either Europe to Asia or from Alaska to the Eastern Seaboard. There are navigational hazards, though: even without significant ice pack only two of the five shipping routes through the legendary Northwest Passage, which according to the Sailing Directions of Arctic Canada “spans the North American Arctic from Davis Strait and Baffin Bay in the east to Bering Strait in the west”, are viable for deep draft ships. The historically ice-blocked passage has excited and frustrated mariners for centuries. On August 21, 2007, though, the ice pack hit lows nearly a quarter below the previous record set in the summer of 2005. For the first time in history, officials opened the Northwest Passage to cargo vessels without an icebreaker. In the summer of 2007 eighty-six ships entered the waters along the Northwest Passage and eleven made the full transit. On August 25, 2008, ice melt once again led officials to declare the Northwest Passage open to cargo vessels without an icebreaker. In the aftermath of the record summers of 2007 and 2008, northern sea routes that can cut thousands of miles off of voyages seem more tangible than ever.
The Arctic shipping routes are also vital to companies that hope to extract the region's vast hydrocarbon resources. However, at the same time that it provides opportunities for shippers and mining companies, increased shipping traffic in geographically vast and dangerous waters in which maintaining effective control of shipping is difficult under the best of circumstances poses intrinsic dangers to the Arctic region, its peoples and its valuable ecosystems. While predictions for a seasonally ice-free Northwest Passage range from six to fifty years, the high-stakes debate over how to divide and control the region is already beginning to play out.
The Arctic shipping routes are also vital to companies that hope to extract the region's vast hydrocarbon resources. However, at the same time that it provides opportunities for shippers and mining companies, increased shipping traffic in geographically vast and dangerous waters in which maintaining effective control of shipping is difficult under the best of circumstances poses intrinsic dangers to the Arctic region, its peoples and its valuable ecosystems. While predictions for a seasonally ice-free Northwest Passage range from six to fifty years, the high-stakes debate over how to divide and control the region is already beginning to play out.
Commercial Potential
With ice melting rapidly, interest in the Arctic has heated up. Indeed, in 2007 Artur Chilingarov, a member of Russia's lower house of parliament, employed a deep-sea submersible to stake a titanium Russian flag 14,000 feet below the ice in a gesture reminiscent of a bygone colonial era. Meanwhile, the mining industry continues to lay stakes on caribou grounds and companies such as ConocoPhillips and BP Exploration Ltd. have already spent hundreds of millions on hydrocarbon leases in the region. The 2008 US Geological Survey estimates that 22% of the world's undiscovered, technically recoverable resources are located in the Arctic, with 84% of these resources located offshore. Even conservative estimates place the amount of methane hydrates in the region at one or more magnitudes larger than the conventional reserves cited by the US Geological Survey. With increasing global demand for natural resources, the competition for control of Arctic reserves is accelerating.
Ice Melt
According to the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program guidelines, the Arctic region currently encompasses thirty-three million square kilometers, or more than one-sixth of the world's landmass. Larger even than Africa or Asia, the Arctic, located north of the Arctic Circle, is warming at more than twice the rate of the rest of the world. NASA satellite images indicate that perennial sea ice cover has decreased at a rate of 9% per decade since the 1970s, a trend that, unless reversed, could bring ice-free Arctic summers within the next hundred years. The 2007 ice cover lows were about a quarter lower than previous record lows set in 2005 and the trend in ice cover loss has accelerated from between -2.2 and -3.0% per decade from 1979-1996 to -10.1 and -10.7% per decade from 1997-2007. In 1987, 57% of the Arctic Basin ice pack was more than 5 years old and 14% was more than 9 years old. By 2007, there was no ice pack older than 9 years old in the Arctic Basin and only 7% of the ice was older than five years. From 2006 to 2007, NASA satellite images showed a 16% year-over-year cloud cover decrease, a change that if perpetuated could have significant and rapid negative consequences on the already melting Arctic ice pack. With anywhere between eight and sixteen million square kilometers of pack ice present at a given time, significant melting levels will mean fundamental changes in the Arctic region. To get an idea of the scope of the problem, it is instructive to examine some documented changes. For instance, on August 13, 2005 a chunk of ice the size of eleven thousand football fields broke free from the Ayles Shelf off the North Coast of Ellesmere Island, 500 miles south of the North Pole. The calving was substantial enough to register as a small earthquake 160 miles away at a Canadian military base. Additionally, the Greenland Ice Sheet's annual loss of mass has risen from 22 to 36 cubic miles between 1999 and 2005.
Arctic Governance Challenges
As Arctic ice melt has accelerated in recent years, the once-distant prospect of Arctic shipping has become increasingly tangible. Less perennial ice has also increased the accessibility of vast seabed oil and natural gas reserves, located primarily off of the Russian coast, and raised other development issues. This chapter introduces the critical question of this paper: how can an effective, equitable and sustainable resource management regime be achieved in the Arctic? Does the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provide a legal basis for adjudication of all existing claims and can it provide an effective legal basis for responsible governance in the Arctic, or does effective Arctic governance require a regional regime? In addition, this chapter provides an overview of recent trends and developments in the Arctic and a basic introduction to each of the eight Arctic nations.
The Russian Revolution: The End of Foreign Exploration of the Russian Arctic
The 1917 October Revolution brought with it Communism and an end to not only the Tsarist order but to foreign voyages of exploration in the Russian Arctic. It opened an era in which Russia's efforts in the north focused on mapping the Arctic islands and identifying a more routinely viable (ice-free) passage through Northern Sea Route as well as protecting Russian use of northern waters in the region. In 1916, a number of boats were reassigned from the Baltic Sea to the Arctic Sea Flotilla in order to protect Russian use of the Northern Sea Route from German submarine and naval activity in the region. In 1926, the Soviet Republic invoked the sector theory, which was used by the Canadians in the North American Arctic, to claim sovereignty over Franz Josef Land as well as all lands lying within the sector to the north of the USSR. However, it was not until 1930 that the Soviets expelled Norwegian hunters from the region and established a weather station at Hooker Island. While this aggression caused considerable anxiety among the Norwegians, they could do little given the limited international interest in the developing situation. By 1933, the Soviets formed the Red Banner Northern Military Fleet, a naval division tasked with protecting Soviet territory north of the Arctic Circle. Around this time, the Soviets also discovered and claimed Severnaya Zemlya, another northern Russian Arctic archipelago and a choke point in the Northern Sea Route. Russia’s grip on the Arctic territory to its north was tightening.
Prior to World War II, in 1937, the Soviet Union established the first of what was to become a series of permanent floating ice stations designed to capture scientific data in the Arctic region. These ice stations were established by the Soviet Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, founded in 1920, which continues to operate a number of drift stations in the Arctic today. The ice stations helped to further the Soviet's understanding of the region as well as cement their sovereignty claims over islands in the Arctic region north of the USSR. During 1937 and 1938, the Soviets, British, Americans, Canadians, Danish and Norwegians all also sent expeditions north to learn more about the Arctic. Contemporarily, the Soviets began practical mineral exploration, for instance mining coal on Spitsbergen in the Svalbard archipelago, and sent the icebreaker Sedov to probe the region. Meanwhile, north of Canada the Canadian icebreaker St. Roch made the first west-east journey of the Northwest Passage between 1940 and 1942.
World War II, as World War I before it, caused global attention to turn towards Europe. As such, the Arctic was mostly neglected for a number of years. Even data from the second International Polar Year in 1937-1938 remained largely unassimilated until after the war. However, the Soviet’s Northern Fleet continued to operate, providing support for Allied Troops and safe passage to over four thousand ships while sinking or damaging over three hundred enemy transport and military ships. Clearly, the Soviets were committed to maintaining a military presence in the Arctic and asserting their claim to the Northern Sea Route even if no other nations demonstrated a similar interest.
Prior to World War II, in 1937, the Soviet Union established the first of what was to become a series of permanent floating ice stations designed to capture scientific data in the Arctic region. These ice stations were established by the Soviet Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, founded in 1920, which continues to operate a number of drift stations in the Arctic today. The ice stations helped to further the Soviet's understanding of the region as well as cement their sovereignty claims over islands in the Arctic region north of the USSR. During 1937 and 1938, the Soviets, British, Americans, Canadians, Danish and Norwegians all also sent expeditions north to learn more about the Arctic. Contemporarily, the Soviets began practical mineral exploration, for instance mining coal on Spitsbergen in the Svalbard archipelago, and sent the icebreaker Sedov to probe the region. Meanwhile, north of Canada the Canadian icebreaker St. Roch made the first west-east journey of the Northwest Passage between 1940 and 1942.
World War II, as World War I before it, caused global attention to turn towards Europe. As such, the Arctic was mostly neglected for a number of years. Even data from the second International Polar Year in 1937-1938 remained largely unassimilated until after the war. However, the Soviet’s Northern Fleet continued to operate, providing support for Allied Troops and safe passage to over four thousand ships while sinking or damaging over three hundred enemy transport and military ships. Clearly, the Soviets were committed to maintaining a military presence in the Arctic and asserting their claim to the Northern Sea Route even if no other nations demonstrated a similar interest.
The Human History of Arctic Russia
A Norwegian explorer named Ottar was one of the first to sail east in search of a northern sea route above Europe and Asia that would connect the two land masses by sea. After leaving Norway in 870, Ottar eventually reached the White Sea in northwestern Russia, although he was stopped there by ice. By the 12th century, people from central Russia – not Norway – migrated to the White Sea region, displacing the native people. These inhabitants, known as the Pomores, used shallow-draft sailing vessels to explore the Arctic waters and coastline. In Russia, they are the equivalent of the North American Inuit people – the inhabitants of the Russian Arctic with the oldest remaining ancestral ties to the region.
Around 1553, Sebastian Cabot, the son of John Cabot, received funding for a British voyage to discover the Northern Sea Route, which the British hoped would prove a shorter trade route over the north of Europe and Russia to China. Under the command of Richard Chancellor, one of Cabot's three ships, the Edward Bonaventure, arrived at modern-day Arkhangelsk in Russia. Here, Ivan the Terrible greeted them warmly. Later, Chancellor succeeded in negotiating a trade treaty that made his London merchant financiers rich. In the ensuing years, the newly formed Muscovy Company, composed of many of the same British merchants, financed other voyages in the region in an attempt to leverage trade with the Russians and discover a route to China. This continued until a 1580 voyage composed of two ships, the William and the George, resulted in the total loss of the William.
By 1594, in spite of a failed voyage led by Belgian explorer Olivier Brunel and the hardships of the English voyages, the Dutch had become sufficiently interested in finding a northerly route to China to fund an expedition. Willem Barents, after whom the Barents Sea off the coast of northern Russia is named, set out to attempt to round the island of Novaya Zemlya's northern tip but was repulsed by solid ice around seventy-seven degrees North latitude. However, when Barents rendezvoused with the other voyage commander, Cornelius Nai, he was encouraged to discover that Nai had successfully navigated the Kara Sea and turned back convinced that there was an open sea route north of Russia. This prompted the House of Orange to finance a larger mission, which was blocked by ice in the Yugorski Shar Strait in 1595. At that point, the Dutch government decided to offer a reward to any Dutch sailor who could discover the passage rather than finance another mission. In 1596, Amsterdam merchants responded by funding a two-boat voyage that once again included Willem Barents and discovered the Svalbard archipelago off of northern Russia. One of the ships headed home, but the ship Barents was aboard headed still further east. In the winter, the ship and its crew became trapped by the ice; only twelve of the seventeen crewmembers made it through to spring and were rescued by the expedition's other ship, which had turned about the previous year before returning to look for them. Hardships along the Northern Sea Route and the success of voyages along other trading routes led the Europeans to focus their efforts in other regions, with only one further unsuccessful voyage by the Englishman Henry Hudson of the Hudson Bay Trading Company.
Thus, this stretch of the Arctic, today considered a crucial piece of Russia's economic future because of its oil, gas and seabed mineral reserves, was left largely to the Russians. Early voyages financed by a wealthy Russian merchant family, the Stroganovs, led the Russians into Siberia. Here, they discovered a wealth of furs that drove a massive Russian expansion eastwards led primarily by fur trappers and religious dissidents. These people and their descendants explored the vast region by water, even establishing northern ports. By 1630, the Russians reached the Lena, the most easterly of three major Russian rivers that flow into the Arctic.
The pattern of eastern expansion by the Russians continued in the decades to come. In 1648, seven boats and ninety men set out towards the Anadyr River in southern Chukotka, a region in northeast Russia rumored to be rich in furs. Eventually, the men were shipwrecked; however, they built boats out of driftwood and eventually returned to Russia with valuable walrus ivory. Their voyage was significant because it was the first to pass through and voyage south of the Bering Strait. However, the expedition was forgotten for nearly a century. Not until a dying Peter the Great, interested in mapping Russian's northern borders and exploring whether the Asian and American continents were connected, signed a decree appointing an expedition led by Vitus Jonassen Bering, a Russian Imperial navy officer of Danish descent, did a similar voyage of discovery take place.
The preparation for Bering’s voyage took more than three years as the expedition leader and his men set out eastward over land, enduring immense hardship, to build their ships on the Pacific's western shore for the ocean portion of their voyage. Bering's expedition failed to conclusively prove that no land bridge between the Asian and American continents existed and returned to Russia without any significant discoveries. However, a second voyage undertaken by Bering did discover some of the northern Aleutian islands in North America. The explorer later died of scurvy in the area on what is now Bering Island. The British explorer James Cook named the Bering Strait and the Bering Sea after him.
Russian interest in the commercial potential of the Arctic sparked investment well beyond Bering’s voyage, though. Indeed, Bering’s journey was only one part of a great Russian expedition that set out to map the Russian coast from the White Sea to Chukotka and determine the feasibility of a northern sea route connecting Europe and China. With much difficulty, this multi-party expedition succeeded in mapping the majority of the northern Russian coast by 1740. While the findings of the explorers did not indicate that a coastal northern sea route was likely to exist, Mikhail Lomonosov, a contemporary of the explorers', believed that a seagoing route further to the north might exist. As such, he planned a seagoing northerly voyage. However, Lomonosov died a few days before his journey, which would in the end be stopped by ice, set out. Any sea route north of Russia, and the accompanying economic and strategic potential, remained elusive at best.
On June 22, 1878, more than a hundred years after Lomonosov's expedition was stopped by ice, the Swedish explorer Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld embarked from southern Sweden in search of the Northern Sea Route. Nordenskiöld continued through a virtually ice-free route above northern Russia until stopped by ice on the northern coast of Chukotka. He and his crew wintered off Cape Dezhnev, just a few days' sail beyond their first encounter with ice in Chukotka, and after trading with the local Chukchi – who knew a few words of English but no Russian – made the Bering Strait the following year, continuing around the world and arriving in Sweden on April 24, 1880 to honorary accolades. Following generations of efforts by various nations, it was a Swede rather than a Russian who first sailed the Northern Sea Route west-east in its entirety.
In a blow to national pride, the Russians were not to have the second west-to-east transit of the North-East Passage either. That accomplishment belongs to the same Norwegian explorer, Roald Amundsen, who between 1903 and 1906 made the first successful transit of the Northwest Passage. Amundsen set out in 1918 along the Northern Sea Route. He completed the Northern Sea Route, crossing into the Pacific Ocean. However, after a long voyage with the end goal of studying tidal flow in the Canadian Arctic by drifting with the ice, Amundsen abandoned his mission and headed for the United States' West Coast. His ship, the Maud, was later abandoned by a new owner at Cambridge Bay in northern Canada. Both Nordenskiöld and Amundsen’s voyages showed that while a Northern Sea Route existed, it was an ice-clogged and dangerous passage, not a commercially viable shipping route.
Around 1553, Sebastian Cabot, the son of John Cabot, received funding for a British voyage to discover the Northern Sea Route, which the British hoped would prove a shorter trade route over the north of Europe and Russia to China. Under the command of Richard Chancellor, one of Cabot's three ships, the Edward Bonaventure, arrived at modern-day Arkhangelsk in Russia. Here, Ivan the Terrible greeted them warmly. Later, Chancellor succeeded in negotiating a trade treaty that made his London merchant financiers rich. In the ensuing years, the newly formed Muscovy Company, composed of many of the same British merchants, financed other voyages in the region in an attempt to leverage trade with the Russians and discover a route to China. This continued until a 1580 voyage composed of two ships, the William and the George, resulted in the total loss of the William.
By 1594, in spite of a failed voyage led by Belgian explorer Olivier Brunel and the hardships of the English voyages, the Dutch had become sufficiently interested in finding a northerly route to China to fund an expedition. Willem Barents, after whom the Barents Sea off the coast of northern Russia is named, set out to attempt to round the island of Novaya Zemlya's northern tip but was repulsed by solid ice around seventy-seven degrees North latitude. However, when Barents rendezvoused with the other voyage commander, Cornelius Nai, he was encouraged to discover that Nai had successfully navigated the Kara Sea and turned back convinced that there was an open sea route north of Russia. This prompted the House of Orange to finance a larger mission, which was blocked by ice in the Yugorski Shar Strait in 1595. At that point, the Dutch government decided to offer a reward to any Dutch sailor who could discover the passage rather than finance another mission. In 1596, Amsterdam merchants responded by funding a two-boat voyage that once again included Willem Barents and discovered the Svalbard archipelago off of northern Russia. One of the ships headed home, but the ship Barents was aboard headed still further east. In the winter, the ship and its crew became trapped by the ice; only twelve of the seventeen crewmembers made it through to spring and were rescued by the expedition's other ship, which had turned about the previous year before returning to look for them. Hardships along the Northern Sea Route and the success of voyages along other trading routes led the Europeans to focus their efforts in other regions, with only one further unsuccessful voyage by the Englishman Henry Hudson of the Hudson Bay Trading Company.
Thus, this stretch of the Arctic, today considered a crucial piece of Russia's economic future because of its oil, gas and seabed mineral reserves, was left largely to the Russians. Early voyages financed by a wealthy Russian merchant family, the Stroganovs, led the Russians into Siberia. Here, they discovered a wealth of furs that drove a massive Russian expansion eastwards led primarily by fur trappers and religious dissidents. These people and their descendants explored the vast region by water, even establishing northern ports. By 1630, the Russians reached the Lena, the most easterly of three major Russian rivers that flow into the Arctic.
The pattern of eastern expansion by the Russians continued in the decades to come. In 1648, seven boats and ninety men set out towards the Anadyr River in southern Chukotka, a region in northeast Russia rumored to be rich in furs. Eventually, the men were shipwrecked; however, they built boats out of driftwood and eventually returned to Russia with valuable walrus ivory. Their voyage was significant because it was the first to pass through and voyage south of the Bering Strait. However, the expedition was forgotten for nearly a century. Not until a dying Peter the Great, interested in mapping Russian's northern borders and exploring whether the Asian and American continents were connected, signed a decree appointing an expedition led by Vitus Jonassen Bering, a Russian Imperial navy officer of Danish descent, did a similar voyage of discovery take place.
The preparation for Bering’s voyage took more than three years as the expedition leader and his men set out eastward over land, enduring immense hardship, to build their ships on the Pacific's western shore for the ocean portion of their voyage. Bering's expedition failed to conclusively prove that no land bridge between the Asian and American continents existed and returned to Russia without any significant discoveries. However, a second voyage undertaken by Bering did discover some of the northern Aleutian islands in North America. The explorer later died of scurvy in the area on what is now Bering Island. The British explorer James Cook named the Bering Strait and the Bering Sea after him.
Russian interest in the commercial potential of the Arctic sparked investment well beyond Bering’s voyage, though. Indeed, Bering’s journey was only one part of a great Russian expedition that set out to map the Russian coast from the White Sea to Chukotka and determine the feasibility of a northern sea route connecting Europe and China. With much difficulty, this multi-party expedition succeeded in mapping the majority of the northern Russian coast by 1740. While the findings of the explorers did not indicate that a coastal northern sea route was likely to exist, Mikhail Lomonosov, a contemporary of the explorers', believed that a seagoing route further to the north might exist. As such, he planned a seagoing northerly voyage. However, Lomonosov died a few days before his journey, which would in the end be stopped by ice, set out. Any sea route north of Russia, and the accompanying economic and strategic potential, remained elusive at best.
On June 22, 1878, more than a hundred years after Lomonosov's expedition was stopped by ice, the Swedish explorer Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld embarked from southern Sweden in search of the Northern Sea Route. Nordenskiöld continued through a virtually ice-free route above northern Russia until stopped by ice on the northern coast of Chukotka. He and his crew wintered off Cape Dezhnev, just a few days' sail beyond their first encounter with ice in Chukotka, and after trading with the local Chukchi – who knew a few words of English but no Russian – made the Bering Strait the following year, continuing around the world and arriving in Sweden on April 24, 1880 to honorary accolades. Following generations of efforts by various nations, it was a Swede rather than a Russian who first sailed the Northern Sea Route west-east in its entirety.
In a blow to national pride, the Russians were not to have the second west-to-east transit of the North-East Passage either. That accomplishment belongs to the same Norwegian explorer, Roald Amundsen, who between 1903 and 1906 made the first successful transit of the Northwest Passage. Amundsen set out in 1918 along the Northern Sea Route. He completed the Northern Sea Route, crossing into the Pacific Ocean. However, after a long voyage with the end goal of studying tidal flow in the Canadian Arctic by drifting with the ice, Amundsen abandoned his mission and headed for the United States' West Coast. His ship, the Maud, was later abandoned by a new owner at Cambridge Bay in northern Canada. Both Nordenskiöld and Amundsen’s voyages showed that while a Northern Sea Route existed, it was an ice-clogged and dangerous passage, not a commercially viable shipping route.
Early Sovereignty Concerns in the North American Arctic
By the middle of the 20th century, much in the Arctic had changed from the days when Henry VII sent John Cabot on his voyages of discovery in the late 15th century. Between 1903 and 1906, the Norwegian Roald Amundsen and his 47-ton herring boat Gjoa became the first team to successfully navigate the Northwest Passage. The feat sparked a hero’s welcome in Norway and took place over the course of more than three years on a journey during which they were frequently locked in and drifted with the ice. American explorer Robert Peary allegedly became the first man to reach the North Pole. Business interest in the region was growing: in 1920, the American Vihljalmur Stefansson predicted widespread future use of Arctic air routes and stated his belief that submarine freighters which could travel under the ice would become economical in the Arctic. By World War I, the Arctic was acknowledged to be a critical region strategically, important not only as a potential sea route but for air transport, military purposes and energy security. The Arctic countries, therefore, began to place increasing importance on establishing a legal basis for their sovereignty claims in the region.
During World War I, the Canadians successfully claimed Ellesmere Island, located to the West of Greenland, from Denmark by establishing a post office on the island as a sign of effective occupation. In 1922, Canada established the Eastern Arctic Patrol, which in 2010 continues to be cited as evidence of lasting Canadian occupation of the far northern continental territories. In 1928, Canada preempted Norway's claims to the Arctic islands north of Canadian shores when it paid $67,000 for the maps of Norwegian explorer Otto Sverdrup. Canadian claims to the Arctic Archipelago were also strengthened by a 1933 Permanent Court of International Justice ruling that granted Denmark ownership of Greenland, stating that not all territory had to be occupied by a country to grant that country sovereignty over it. Today, Canada enjoys effective sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago.
In order to protect their Arctic claims, nations followed Canada’s example and increasingly looked to shore up their legal claim to sovereignty by establishing outposts and patrols in the region. In addition, they began to enforce national laws – for instance, the Canadians began to enforce whaling regulations in the Arctic. In Greenland, the Danes established Sirius sledge patrols that continue to monitor the country for unwanted visitors in 2010. The Canadians responded to the Danish Sirius patrols with the establishment of the small but well-respected Canadian Rangers division, which to this day employs almost exclusively Inuit to monitor Canada's vast northerly region. The 1926 Arctic Islands Preserve Act protected traditional hunting and fishing rights for the Canadian Inuit and further established the case for Canadian sovereignty in the region. By the early twentieth century, the Arctic nations clearly recognized that at some point in the future they were likely to have to defend their claims to Arctic lands in a court of law. Already, they were starting to build their case.
During World War I, the Canadians successfully claimed Ellesmere Island, located to the West of Greenland, from Denmark by establishing a post office on the island as a sign of effective occupation. In 1922, Canada established the Eastern Arctic Patrol, which in 2010 continues to be cited as evidence of lasting Canadian occupation of the far northern continental territories. In 1928, Canada preempted Norway's claims to the Arctic islands north of Canadian shores when it paid $67,000 for the maps of Norwegian explorer Otto Sverdrup. Canadian claims to the Arctic Archipelago were also strengthened by a 1933 Permanent Court of International Justice ruling that granted Denmark ownership of Greenland, stating that not all territory had to be occupied by a country to grant that country sovereignty over it. Today, Canada enjoys effective sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago.
In order to protect their Arctic claims, nations followed Canada’s example and increasingly looked to shore up their legal claim to sovereignty by establishing outposts and patrols in the region. In addition, they began to enforce national laws – for instance, the Canadians began to enforce whaling regulations in the Arctic. In Greenland, the Danes established Sirius sledge patrols that continue to monitor the country for unwanted visitors in 2010. The Canadians responded to the Danish Sirius patrols with the establishment of the small but well-respected Canadian Rangers division, which to this day employs almost exclusively Inuit to monitor Canada's vast northerly region. The 1926 Arctic Islands Preserve Act protected traditional hunting and fishing rights for the Canadian Inuit and further established the case for Canadian sovereignty in the region. By the early twentieth century, the Arctic nations clearly recognized that at some point in the future they were likely to have to defend their claims to Arctic lands in a court of law. Already, they were starting to build their case.
Precedent for International Cooperation
As the early years of Arctic exploration drew to a close, the first concerted international coordination in the Arctic occurred during the first International Polar Year in 1881-1884. The International Polar Year was dedicated to the scientific study of the planet's two poles; twelve nations pledged to establish observation stations in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. This task was not without difficulty: for instance, the near total loss of the American Lady Franklin Bay expedition headed by Adolphus Greely, an explorer tasked with establishing the most remote observation station planned, became the largest Arctic disaster since the disappearance of Franklin and his men. In total, more than seven hundred men braved the polar climates during the first International Polar Year to establish fourteen principal research stations, including twelve stations in the Arctic, that provided the first concerted scientific collection of data on polar geophysical and meteorological events.
In 1932-33, on the fiftieth anniversary of the first International Polar Year, forty-four nations helped establish research bases to help improve weather forecasting in the Arctic and to establish a better understanding of terrestrial magnetism. This effort was tagged as the second International Polar Year. The findings it produced, the nations believed, would improve both air and sea navigation. While a great amount of data was collected during these expeditions, further data collection was hampered by weather conditions: much of the mens' time was spent on survival rather than scientific observation. The forty permanent research bases established in the Arctic at this time helped the International Meteorological Association develop an early understanding of the newly discovered jet stream. The extreme hardship endured by the explorers, though, was convincing proof that the Arctic remained of greater geopolitical than operational importance to the Arctic nations.
In 1932-33, on the fiftieth anniversary of the first International Polar Year, forty-four nations helped establish research bases to help improve weather forecasting in the Arctic and to establish a better understanding of terrestrial magnetism. This effort was tagged as the second International Polar Year. The findings it produced, the nations believed, would improve both air and sea navigation. While a great amount of data was collected during these expeditions, further data collection was hampered by weather conditions: much of the mens' time was spent on survival rather than scientific observation. The forty permanent research bases established in the Arctic at this time helped the International Meteorological Association develop an early understanding of the newly discovered jet stream. The extreme hardship endured by the explorers, though, was convincing proof that the Arctic remained of greater geopolitical than operational importance to the Arctic nations.
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