Conclusion

Policy decisions in the Arctic can neither be considered in isolation or wait until the rush is on: the Arctic region needs to be protected and managed. In large part, a cooperative Arctic regime would be an environmental protection regime, designed to ensure that the region is developed in a sustainable fashion and that risks are accounted for when possible. Creating a legal regime should be undertaken now, not twenty or thirty years down the road. Contextual factors should drive nations to coordinate: there is only one chance to protect regional fisheries, endangered species such as the polar bear and whale breeding grounds in Lancaster Sound. Implementing a vessel piloting system in the Arctic will take time and should be begun as soon as possible. Case studies of Antarctic waterborne tourism should be conducted to identify best policies for the Arctic region, including limitations on both the number of tourist vessels and passengers as well as strict hull build specifications. Regionally integrated ice and hull regimes as well as a centrally controlled ship processing and monitoring system would provide better oversight of shipping in the region. In the end, however, these systems need to be backed by strong support from local Coast Guards. Such support will require new investment in Arctic-class icebreakers, in particular reinvestment by the United States in its icebreaking fleet. Russia has already demonstrated its commitment to rebuilding its Arctic fleet and Canada lacks the resources to physically patrol its entire Arctic coastline, so the United States must pick up the slack. A regional treaty system would address holes in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, minimize development’s impact on the region and through increased dialogue and information sharing between nations decrease the likelihood of military confrontation. Creating an effective regime to govern Arctic waters will ensure that the Arctic is well-protected, thus promoting an intergenerational transfer of the region’s wealth. In spite of the other-minded 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, a regional regime provides too many benefits to member nations and the Arctic region to be cast aside as a political impossibility. In reality, to protect the Arctic from excessive speculation in investment vehicles and environmental disaster the nations of the world need to create a regional management regime. Almost five decades ago, nations around the globe came together to protect the world’s other pole, and today circumstances again call for historic cooperation.

Denmark

Denmark, which has a stake in the region through Greenland, should explore the oil and natural gas reserves off of Greenland. This could bring additional revenue to the 55,000 residents of Greenland as well as to the Danish government. However, the Danish government should approach this with the knowledge that reserves would be expensive to extract and the overall likelihood of any large oil, gas or mineral windfall is small. Denmark should also promote itself as a haven for scientific research, committing to the region diplomatically and scientifically while keeping costs to a minimum because it appears to have little to gain through high levels of investment. In particular, Denmark should not consider purchasing icebreakers.

Finland and Sweden

Finland and Sweden are two Arctic nations with little negotiating power – neither has new territory to claim – who have similar interests moving forward. Primarily, they should encourage the implementation of strong vessel monitoring systems. This can be accomplished through a vocal presence at regional forums, for instance meetings of the Arctic Council, and a surface presence in the region. Sweden and Finland should also work jointly to ensure that shipping rules are safe and effective so that the two nations are not harmed by negative externalities that might stem from unsafe Arctic shipping.

Norway

Through a commitment to increased Nordic security cooperation as outlined in the Stoltenberg Report, Norway has made it clear that it does not intend to take its role as an Arctic nation lightly - a wise policy stance given Norway’s proximity to Russia. In the future, Norway will be charged with protecting its own sovereignty from Russian infringement, particularly in the Svalbard Archipelago, where Russia maintains that it has fishing rights in Norwegian waters. Norway needs to continue to focus on regional policy and security cooperation while ensuring that increased offshore and onshore oil and gas operations do not result in environmental disasters. It must also effectively police its fisheries and because Northern Sea Route shipping will often pass through Norwegian waters should investigate expansion of its icebreaking capabilities (currently, Norway has two ice-class vessels), perhaps in conjunction with Russia. As a nation where oil and natural gas extraction occur in the same region fishermen depend on for their livelihood, strong policymaking and enforcement can help Norway emerge as a model of environmental stewardship.

Iceland

Iceland has no new territory to claim in the Arctic, no navy or air force to speak of and a Coast Guard staffed by only three patrol boats, the newest of which was built in 1975. Iceland’s priorities in the Arctic are to maintain its fishing industry through effective regulation and to promote sustainable practices and scientific cooperation. Effective policy enforcement in Iceland’s Exclusive Economic Zone will require new investments in the Icelandic Coast Guard to ensure that the fleet, already minimal, does not fall into disrepair. Iceland should also pursue additional revenue from seabed oil and natural gas leases where it is ecologically sensible.

Canada

Canada claims sovereignty over the second-largest Arctic coastline (Russia has the longest) yet is plagued by a lack of fiscal commitment to the region, exemplified by the country’s inability to follow through on a 1987 pledge to create a Polar Class 8 icebreaker. In the future, Canada should maintain a minimal surface presence in the Arctic region in order to assert sovereignty while forcing other nations to bear the cost of opening the Northwest Passage. Given Canada’s status as a Far North nation, the government should also encourage international scientific cooperation, particularly on warming of the Arctic, changing ecosystems, emissions of greenhouse gases from melting permafrost and these changes’ effects on indigenous people. Like the United States, Canada needs to make the Arctic an integral part of national policy rather than an afterthought. It should build and then seek to profit from new northern ports, including building rail lines to ship goods into the now inaccessible Canadian north. Canada will not be able to stop Arctic development, so it must seek to control and participate in the region’s growth.

United States

The United States should awaken to its role as an Arctic nation. If the country expects to use the Northwest Passage more extensively, it must build more icebreakers. National security interests should drive politicians to seek broad international demilitarization commitments that will maximize the effectiveness of security expenditures in the region. To establish legal precedent for the country’s claim that the Northwest Passage is an international strait with right of innocent passage and overflight for aircraft, the United States should do everything possible to facilitate the safe and expeditious development of shipping through the Northwest Passage. In addition, as a world power and scientific leader the United States can be a leader on environmental protection issues and provide scientific support. Finally, the United States can use its extensive information network, including its Arctic radar system, and bargaining power to aid in information exchange and gathering as well as diplomacy.

Russia

Russia, as the only nation with nuclear icebreakers and a stated commitment to turning the Arctic into its main resource base by 2020, should continue to build icebreakers capable of operating deep in Arctic territory. This will help to facilitate mineral, oil and gas development in its territory and enable shipping to occur on a more regular basis. In the near-term, Russia could also provide icebreaking services in non-Russian waters at a fee, for instance in the Northwest Passage. Russia should increase transparency about its Arctic operations in order to quell international concerns about its ambitions and commit to the effective disposal of spent nuclear fuel. In the future, Russia might serve as a model for monetizing and effectively policing northern sea routes while the country could utilize its icebreaking knowledge to gain a larger share of shipbuilding contracts for ice-capable vessels. Due to national security concerns, it would be surprising if Russia decided to allow its shipyards to build nuclear-powered icebreakers for foreign nations.

National Futures in the Arctic: Overview

Under a new regional environmental management framework, the Arctic nations would continue to have different priorities and roles in the Arctic region on a case by case basis. For some, like Russia, natural resource extraction will remain a central short- and long-term objective. For others, like Iceland, effective enforcement of fisheries policies in their own and contiguous waters will be more important to the national economic outlook. In light of this, national priorities moving forward are briefly outlined below.

Icebreakers: a Necessary Investment?

One major strategic issue for the Arctic nations surrounds future plans to build cost-intensive icebreakers. Indeed, a modern polar icebreaker costs well over one billion dollars. Icebreakers are a politically sensitive topic and have design and construction lead times of eight to ten years. Given that climate scientists now favor models which indicate total summer ice melt by 2030-2040, one might question the logic of new investments in icebreaking capabilities. Of course, whether to invest in new icebreakers is a politically charged issue and policy outcomes will differ on a nation-by-nation basis. However, some basic conclusions are outlined below.

On the whole, icebreakers represent a large investment for a minimal surface presence. They are slow, carry relatively large crews and are expensive to operate and maintain. Non-nuclear (in 2010, this implies non-Russian) icebreakers are limited in range by fuel considerations and can put to sea for only a few months at a time. In addition, icebreakers represent an easy surface target in the event of war. It would be impossible for even a sizable fleet of icebreakers to entirely patrol activity in the vast Arctic region.

On the other hand, icebreakers do serve a variety of roles in the polar world. Their very presence is a deterrent to rogue activity, for instance unauthorized Arctic voyages by non-Arctic class Chinese tankers. Icebreakers serve as scientific research platforms and thus represent crucial pieces of the global information network in the Arctic. Icebreakers have the potential to dramatically reduce the risk of shipping in the Arctic by providing icebreaking services to ships in transit. They can likewise help to keep Arctic shipping routes open for a longer season than might otherwise be possible. In the event of a serious environmental disaster, a well-positioned icebreaker could be the only surface vessel in a position to respond and provide ground support. Icebreakers can also work to enforce fisheries regulations and regularly inspect offshore oil and gas platforms to ensure compliance with best practices.

This paper advocates, therefore, that new icebreaker construction is in the case of the larger and better endowed Arctic nations, namely Russia and the United States, warranted. However, icebreakers should be seen as just one piece of the global Arctic infrastructure. Well-developed monitoring infrastructure, such as a comprehensive radar network, regular area overflights and a central command system, should complement icebreakers. Icebreakers should be used mainly for scientific and shipping support with occasional regulation enforcement duties when necessary. In even the most optimistic scenario, it would be 2018 before the United States could fully construct a polar class icebreaker. With full summer ice melt predicted by 2030-2040, more research into the type and number of vessels warranted is needed before such a significant investment is made. However, any country planning to build an icebreaker in the future should begin immediately to ensure that the vessel is put to proper use for the bulk of its service life. Tankers engaged in Arctic transit are a different matter entirely and construction should be mandated to Arctic-class specifications for all such vessels to minimize the risk of environmental disaster.